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ABSTRACT 
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) are a global problem significantly contributing to 
instability throughout the undeveloped and developing-world. ERW also become a 
primary component used in Improvised Explosive Device (IED) fabrication across the 
globe, which poses a direct threat to the United States (U.S). military and its strategic 
partners.  
Finding ERW is not the principal problem effecting stability. Safely removing and 
disposing of ERW in a timely manner is. In most cases, localized disposal capacity nor 
any safe and secure storage solutions exist. As a result, ERW remain a threat and 
hindrance to stabilization even after being discovered or collected. 
This thesis demonstrates the specific design characteristics for a proposed ERW 
Collection Point (ERW-CP) and describes how the deployment of systems based on these 
characteristics can assist in mitigating the global ERW threat. 
The specific characteristics that make ERW a continuous threat and hindrance to 
development are identified. Evidence is provided that ERW-CPs can mitigate the 
identified negative effects of ERW and constitute a viable option using a simple, scalable, 
sustainable, design and construction methodology. Data collected from empirical tests are 
provided to support the adequacy of the system design.  
Recommendations are also provided as to how the ERW-CP design can best be 
disseminated to assist in strategic partner capacity building, global ERW and Counter-
IED (C-IED) efforts, while adhering to global Mine/UXO awareness efforts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION TO EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR 
(ERW) 
A. THE GLOBAL IMPACT OF ERW 
1. ERW As a Catalyst for Instability 
Unexploded (UXO) and abandoned ordnance, more broadly known as Explosive 
Remnants of War (ERW),1 is a global problem with a broad range of contributing factors. 
ERW can be an issue in any country or region in which an armed conflict has occurred on 
its soil. In 2010, globally, 21,112 landmine and cluster munition civilian casualties were 
reported.2 
In Afghanistan alone, over 2,000 communities (1,303,553 people) remain affected 
by landmines and ERW with an average of 40 Afghanis accidentally killed or injured 
every month by UXO.3 Additionally, United Nations’ (UN) figures state that, in 2011, 
nearly 1,000 civilian casualties from insurgent-placed landmine-like IEDs were intended 
to attack NATO troops.4  
Aside from casualties, ERW denies local populations access to their land 
hindering post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. Somalia is a prime example. 
With an affected population estimated at 1,340,600, the effects of ERW can be seen in 
almost every aspect of life. Of the affected population, 60 percent of ERW-related 
casualties resulted from actually handling mines or UXO.5 
                                                 
1 Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) according to a 2006 change to the UN Convention on 
Conventional Weapons (CCW) no longer covers all forms of post-conflict ordnance. The change was 
intended to distinguish between unexploded ordnance (UXO) and ordnance still being used, or capable of 
being used, such as a small arms/light weapons (SA/LW) caches, land mines, and IEDs. However, once a 
cache is discovered, a landmine unearthed, or ordnance removed from a disrupted or abandoned IED, it 
becomes ERW once again. 
2 Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, May 1, 2012, http://www.the-monitor.org/. 
3 E-MINE Electronic Mine Information Network, “Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2011,” United 
Nations Mine Action Service, 2, 2011, http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/1/portfoliofinal.pdf. 
4 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, ed. Alexander Nicoll, “IEDs: The Home-Made 
Bombs That Changed Modern War Receive Strategic,” Strategic Comments, August 27, 2012, 
http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-18-2012/august/ieds-the-home-
made-bombs-that-changed-modern-war/. 
5 E-MINE Electronic Mine Information Network, “Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2011.”  
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Although significant, the ability to find ERW is not the principle problem 
effecting stability. Through numerous efforts, ERW is properly recovered everyday in 
regions across the globe. Unfortunately, it is also discovered and handled unintentionally 
on the same scale and frequency. The significant challenge remains in properly managing 
ERW once it has been discovered or recovered by untrained personnel. 
The mismanagement of ERW allows it to remain a threat to life and limb. 
Mismanaged ERW are not only an immediate threat to the local population, they are a 
highly pilferable commodity, which leads to ERW becoming a primary component used 
in IED fabrication throughout the world, and as such, pose a direct threat to deployed 
U.S. personnel and U.S. strategic partner personnel. Additionally, ERW pose serious 
post-conflict humanitarian problems and remain a daily threat to populations in need of 
development assistance and to the humanitarian aid workers operating in these areas. 
B. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
The primary purpose of this research is to provide an Explosive Remnants of War 
—Collection Point (ERW-CP) proof of concept design that will demonstrate the unique 
characteristics of these collection points and to describe how they can assist in mitigating 
the global ERW threat. The primary purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the specific 
design characteristics of ERW-CPs and how they will assist in mitigating the global 
ERW threat.  
Specifically, this thesis identifies the specific characteristics that make ERW a 
continuous threat and hindrance to stabilization and development. Arguments are 
provided that proper ERW management through ERW-CPs can mitigate the negative 
effects of ERW and what constitutes an effective collection point design. Evidence 
collected from empirical tests is provided to support the adequacy of the design.  
An ERW-CP design is described that implements a simple, scalable, design and 
construction methodology that utilizes locally sourced, sustainable, and reused materials. 
Recommendations are provided as to how the ERW-CP design can best be disseminated 
to assist in strategic partner capacity building and global ERW and Counter-IED (C-IED) 
efforts.   
 3
1. ERW and Instability 
In 1980, the UN took aggressive action against the global ERW threat when it 
drafted the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). The CCW has five protocols, 
two of which directly informed this thesis. Protocol II focuses on landmines, booby-traps 
and other devices, while Protocol V focuses on the global problem of ERW.  
Under Protocol V, state or non-state actors involved in an armed conflict are 
required to take action to clear, remove or destroy ERW, and record, retain and transmit 
information related to the use or abandonment of explosive ordnances. They are also 
obligated to take all feasible precautions for the protection of civilians and humanitarian 
missions and organizations. Conflict participants, in a position to do so, should provide 
cooperation and assistance for marking, clearance, removal, destruction, and victim 
assistance, amongst other things.6 Since the drafting of the CCW, the United States has 
had a standing commitment to dealing with ERW. However, some deficiencies are 
present in the U.S.’s ability to empower partner nation populations in the safe and secure 
management of ERW. 
The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate the potential effectiveness and cost 
benefit of the ERW-CP proposed design and describe how it may be deployed to address 
ERW management problems.  
C. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION & NESTED QUESTIONS 
1. Managing ERW Effectively 
This thesis addresses the utility and implementation of ERW-CPs. First, what 
would be the practical benefit of effective ERW management for the United States and its 
strategic partners in stability operations? While many strategic partner countries have 
pursued robust ERW disposal and mine action programs as part of larger stability efforts, 
a significant gap still exists in ERW management capabilities. It is hypothesized that  
 
 
                                                 
6 E-MINE Electronic Mine Information Network, “Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons–
Protocols II and V,” October 2006, http://mineaction.org/overview.asp?o=1117. 
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effective ERW management for U.S. partners will fill a gap in the ERW mitigation 
process and give the United States, its partners, and potential strategic partners another 
tool to increase regional stability. 
This thesis also focuses on the ERW-CP design proof of concept, which requires 
empirical data demonstrating the effectiveness of ERW-CPs based on design 
requirements. Additionally, it compares the cost and benefits of ERW-CPs against 
traditional ERW storage efforts, and provides positive crosslinks to larger U.S. national 
priority efforts and strategic partner capacity and stabilization efforts.  
The research results demonstrate the effectiveness of the ERW-CP design and 
provide the basis for a bottom up implementation plan that will aid U.S. forces and 
strategic partners conducting post conflict reconstruction and stabilization efforts; all of 
which must be accomplished while adhering to UN CCW protocols and Mine/UXO 
awareness programs.  
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II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM  
A. OVERVIEW 
1. Organization and Execution 
ERW, according to a 2006 change to the UN CCW, no longer covers all forms of 
post-conflict ordnance. The change was intended to distinguish between UXO and 
ordnance still being used, or capable of being used, such as a weapons cache, land mines, 
cluster munitions and IEDs. However, once a usable item or cache is discovered, a 
landmine unearthed, or ordnance removed from a disrupted or abandoned IED, it 
becomes ERW once again. As such, this thesis groups all instances into the generalized 
term ERW or ERW problem. 
To grasp the scope of the global ERW problem and its effect on stability, it is 
necessary to look no further than the numerous internationally recognized organizations 
that distribute publications and maintain websites focused specifically on the subject.  
A suitable starting point is the U.S. Department of State’s “To Walk the Earth in 
Safety: The United States’ Commitment to Conventional Weapons Destruction.” This 
study covers all aspects of the global ERW, landmine problem and has combined the 
issues into one, Conventional Weapons Destruction (CWD). Like most studies of this 
nature, it is broken down by region: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle 
East. The study breaks the regions down even further by countries and examines each 
country’s individual variables contributing to the problem.7  
The UN provides a similar study on an annual basis entitled “Portfolio of Mine 
Action Projects 2011,”8 as do many other organizations, such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and numerous privately funded Non-Governmental  
 
                                                 
7 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “To Walk the Earth in Safety: The 
United States’ Commitment to Conventional Weapons Destruction,” 9th ed., July 2010. 
8 E-MINE Electronic Mine Information Network, “Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons–
Protocols II and V.” 
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Organizations (NGOs). Additionally, several organizations have developed task 
frameworks to aid in understanding instability variables, which often focus on issues such 
as ERW. 
B. FINDINGS 
1. Conceptual Literature 
While the literature indicates various causes of ERW problems in various 
geographic areas, it remains largely descriptive. Generally, this body of work provides 
the scope and scale of the ERW problem by country and the efforts being taken to 
mitigate the presence of ERW. While various approaches to the ERW problem are 
discussed in terms of locating and then disposing of ERW, sufficient work on prescriptive 
measures to reduce instability stemming from ERW substantially does not exist. Also, not 
readily available is a locally derived and sustainable solution for temporarily storing and 
securing ERW awaiting disposal. This problem can be linked to a wide variety of related 
topics: Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Village Stability Operations (VSO), 
Humanitarian Demining Operations (HDO), Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) 
and the global C-IED effort. Although the literature addresses most of these concepts and 
explains how these separate elements and efforts are intended to work in concert to 
achieve regional stability successfully, very rarely do they provide singular examples that 
incorporate all or most of the aspects. This thesis reviews differing scales of the ERW 
management deficiency selected from several studies. 
The ERW management gap is caused by the relationship between the scale of 
ERW contamination and the available ERW management capacity and limitations. It is 
well established that ERW is a global problem. However, each country or region has 
specific variables that contribute to issues of ERW management within that country or 
region.  
The main issues concerning the management of ERW can be explained by 
viewing all the commonly understood variables in post-conflict reconstruction and 
stabilization efforts. The common structure for tackling the post-conflict environment is a 
task framework. Most frameworks are organized into three conceptual phases: initial 
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response, transformation, and fostering sustainability. The framework tasks are usually 
organized into pillars, such as security, justice/reconciliation, social/economic well being, 
and governance/participation. The pillars are inherently interconnected and arguably, 
success in one is usually dependent on success in another, but they are not necessarily 
sequential.9  
Most security pillars specifically cite disarmament as one of the key variables in 
reconstruction and stability operations. In these frameworks, disarmament usually falls 
under a Small Arms and Light Weapons (SA/LW) provision requiring the securing, 
storing, and disposing of weapons and ammunition while indigenous arms control 
capacity is developed. Additionally, ERW issues are usually addressed under a UXO 
provision. The post-conflict reconstruction task framework presented by the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army 
(AUSA)10 is an excellent point of reference when breaking down post-conflict 
reconstruction and stabilization efforts.  
In 2005, the U.S. Department of State (DoS) adopted the CSIS model and 
published a very similar framework. The DoS and CSIS frameworks are almost identical 
concerning security and dealing with the ERW problem and their effect on stability 
operations.11 The UN, while it does not have a single framework, has a myriad of 
publications and websites concerning all aspects of post conflict and stability operations. 
Although the UN frameworks are country specific, they largely consist of national policy 
suggestions and rarely enter into details. 
 
 
                                                 
9 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, “Post 
Conflict Reconstruction Essentials Tasks,” April 2005. 
10 Center for Strategic and International Studies and Association of the United States Army, “Post-
Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework Report,” May 2002, 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/framework.pdf. 
11 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, “Post 
Conflict Reconstruction Essentials Tasks.”   
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Taken together, these frameworks demonstrate the need for proper ERW and 
SA/LW management as a key variable in the success of post-conflict reconstruction and 
stability operations. However, they are just frameworks and do not delineate the exact 
requirements best suited for such operations and the unique variables inherent to 
individual countries and regions in these situations.  
In conjunction with framing the global ERW problem, significant efforts have 
been made to educate affected populations properly on the dangers of ERW, and 
landmines. The United States, through the Department of State’s Office of Weapons 
Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) in partnership with the Department of Defense’s 
Humanitarian Demining Research and Development (HD R&D) Program, attempts to 
solve the ERW problem by aiding its strategic partners in educating populations on the 
dangers of ERW. This effort is in concert with international programs, such as the UN’s 
Mine/UXO awareness program. Most notably, the “Don’t touch it, mark it and report it” 
campaign.12  
The efforts to educate ERW affected populations, while idealistic, must not be 
ignored. The “Don’t touch it, mark it, report it” campaign concentrates on teaching local 
populations to properly identify, but not handle, ERW under any circumstance.13 This 
viewpoint may seem contradictory to the concept of a locally managed ERW collection 
point, if the global awareness effort is focused on not handling ERW. Inherently, ERW 
will be handled for it to be collected. However, an ERW-CP is only needed when no 
reliable reporting system exists above the local authority or, even when reported, the 
capacity to dispose of the ERW in a timely manner is not available. To be effective, the 
ERW-CP project should adhere to global Mine/UXO awareness program efforts based on 
the stabilization task frameworks. 
In addition to task frameworks, project profiles are used to reference and frame 
the ERW problem to prioritize efforts. Works cited earlier, such as the U.S. Department 
of States’ “To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States’ Commitment to Conventional 
                                                 
12 United Nations, “International Guidelines for Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance Awareness 
Education,” (n.d.), http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/mineawar.pdf. 
13 Ibid. 
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Weapons Destruction,”14 and CWD15 provide such profiles, as do the UN and many 
other NGOs on an annual basis that cover all the affected regions of the globe.16 
2. Efforts, Profiles and Examples 
In addition to studies and educational programs, the United States provides direct 
assistance to its partners in finding and disposing of the maximum amount of ERW 
possible. Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams regularly conduct 
multilateral ERW disposal operations around the world. To give an example of the 
magnitude of the ERW challenge, during the 2009 iteration of the annual Balikatan 
exercise, U.S. Navy EOD and their Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) counterparts 
disposed of over 346,500 lbs. of ERW in the southern Philippines alone.17  
Unfortunately, ERW and demining programs are often limited in their reach into 
isolated areas, and the United States cannot dispose of all ERW simultaneously all over 
the world. As a result, ERW requires storage at the locally isolated level. Lack of, or 
ineffective storage facilities for ERW awaiting disposal, can substantially affect ERW-
related instability.  
Under Colombia’s Program for the Eradication of Illicit Cultivation (PCI), the 
government employs manual coca eradicators to destroy fields of illegal crops. These 
eradicators are usually young peasants from impoverished regions who receive little to no 
training prior to eradication operations. Consequently, 47% of Colombian landmine 
victims in 2010 were coca eradicators. As of May 2011, the Presidential Program for 
Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines (PAICMA) and PCI reported 14 
victims of antipersonnel mines (APM) directly linked to manual eradication.18  
                                                 
14 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “To Walk the Earth in Safety: The 
United States’ Commitment to Conventional Weapons Destruction.” 
15 Ibid. 
16 E-MINE Electronic Mine Information Network, “Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2011.” 
17 Neptunus Rex, “Operation: Flashpoint,” ed. Naval Special Operatoions Group Philippine Fleet, The 
Tridnet, Naval Special Operatoions Group Philippine Fleet, Second Quarter 2011, no. EOD Issue (April-
July 2011): 10. 




However, these numbers are most likely inaccurate. Indigenous populations may 
be reluctant to cooperate fully with demining efforts as Colombian military forces 
conduct the bulk of demining operations.19 
An unfortunate result is the Colombian government may be at risk of violating 
Article 5 of the Ottawa Treaty by sending uneducated civilians into mined areas without 
adequate mine awareness training. Article 5 states: 
Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its 
jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or 
suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-
personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are 
perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to 
ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines 
contained therein have been destroyed.20  
In Colombia’s defense, the above-described programs operating under the 
frameworks do provide available demining capability to support these operations, but 
these efforts continually fall short of the overwhelming need, which unfortunately, leads 
to unofficial programs functioning out of necessity that do not fall under any frameworks. 
Village demining activities are becoming more and more frequent. Local 
populations who do not have formal training and who do not have access to the proper 
demining equipment are executing demining out of necessity. According to 
organizations, such as UNICEF, OCHA, the EU, Landmines Observatory, and the 
Colombian Campaign Against Landmines, these activities are occurring both individually 
and in groups.  
Unfortunately, these efforts only begin to address the full regional scope of 
landmine contamination or the ERW problem in Colombia. To compound the problem, 
once these unofficial demining operations have cleared an area, the locals have no way to 
dispose of the ERW. ERW, whether conventional or improvised, rapidly deteriorates over 
                                                 
19 Geneva Call, “Mine Action in the Midst of Internal Conflict,” ed. Elisabeth Reusse-Decrey 
Matthew Pountney, September 1, 2006, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?id=38542&lng=en. 
20 United Nations, “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” September 19, 1997, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. 
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time and becomes increasingly unstable the longer it is exposed to environments, such as 
the humid jungles of Colombia. Obviously, all parties involved would like to locate, 
remove or render safe, and dispose of all landmine and ERW contamination. However, 
even if Colombia received unlimited support, it could not dispose of everything 
simultaneously throughout the region. As a result, the inability to store ERW awaiting 
disposal, yet again, substantially affects stability. 
Having no disposal options, the local village demining effort, and often official 
demining operations, attempt to provide secure storage on their own. In the environments 
in which most demining occurs, suitable and secure protective structures are not available 
nor can they be locally constructed, which is another example of the ERW management 
gap represented in storage shortfalls. 
ERW storage is not a new issue. Since the end of WWII, significant work has 
been done to remove and dispose of unstable and UXO. However, most of the solutions 
and techniques developed to manage ERW properly are unrealistic for most of the 
undeveloped and developing world, which suffers the most from the ERW problem. In 
2002, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining published a report 
describing the hazards associated with the mismanagement of ERW, and cited over 70 
catastrophic incidents. From 1990 to 2002, 31 reported (official) ammunition storage area 
incidents occurred in post-conflict environments, and 39 incidents in non-conflict 
environments resulted in 2,461+ casualties. Over half these incidents were not reported, 
or did not have an accurate report done for the Net Explosive Weight (NEW) of the 
incident. For the 23 incidents that were reported, the estimated NEW totaled over 33,203 
tons.21  
Unfortunately, these statistics only cover large facilities that could not easily go 
unnoticed. The report excludes the hundreds of active SA/LW caches, and small 
improvised ERW storage facilities that unintentionally detonate every year that kill and 
                                                 
21 The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, ed. Jack Glattbach, “Explosive 
Remnants of War (ERW)–Undesired Explosive Events in Ammunition Storage Areas,” International 
Relations and Security Network, 36–38, 2002, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=26686.  
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injure hundreds.22 In 2003, the United Nations Development Programme estimated that 
in West Africa alone, an estimated eight million illicit small arms and light weapons 
exited. These weapons range from the common AK-47 and rocket propelled grenades 
(RPG) to truck mounted small caliber artillery.23 All these weapons, even when 
recovered and taken out of circulation, require improvised storage facilities for their 
ammunition. If not secured properly, the ammunition finds its way back into circulation 
or into the IED cycle. If secured but stored improperly, the storage points become as real 
a threat as their larger NEW brethren. This entire situation is cited as one of the main 
contributing factor to instability in the region.24  
C. SUMMARY 
1. Current Global ERW Management Solutions 
The continuous ERW management gap is caused by the relationship between 
ERW global management mandates and country or regional ERW management 
limitations. It is well established that ERW is a global problem. However, each country 
or region has specific variables that contribute to issues of ERW mismanagement within 
that country or region.  
Despite the tremendous efforts to educate affected populations about the hazards 
of ERW and landmines, Mine/UXO awareness programs still fall short of reality. The 
mantra “Don’t touch it, mark it, report it”25 is dependent on a system to report “it” to, and 
the knowledge or hope that someone is capable of conducting disposal operations once 
the report is received. Unfortunately, this situation is often not the reality, as is the case in 
Columbia and many other regions.  
                                                 
22 John Borrie, “Explosive Remnants of War a Global Survey,” ed. Rosy Cave and Richard Lloyd, 
Landmine Action, 2003, http://www.unidir.org/pdf/activites/pdf-act287.pdf. 
23 ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP). Programme to Tackle the Illicit 
Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in ECOWAS States, United Nations Development 
Programme (New York: United Nations, 2003), 3. 
24 Ibid. 
25 United Nations, “International Guidelines for Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance Awareness 
Education.”  
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Traditional “First World” ERW management approaches are idealistic at best. 
Often times, the guidance is vague or so restrictive, it becomes unrealistic. Rarely does a 
guide describe the actual facilities in which ERW or SA/LW should be secured or 
stored.26 In their defense, a certain level of understanding exists that these guides are just 
that, guides to best practices and are to be followed to the appropriate levels. 
Unfortunately, this sentiment often leads to improvised structures constructed of 
sandbags and or used tires that do not provide adequate protection to the populace from 
ERW, nor do they protect the ERW from further deterioration from the elements. In most 
situations, a result of lack of access is the cause. At the low end of the spectrum, simply 
digging a deep enough hole for ERW storage in every village affected by ERW does not 
provide an adequate solution. At the opposite end of the spectrum, building military 
grade facilities is infeasible. In developing parts of the world, it is very rare to find a 
population that has access to suitable construction technologies required to construct first 
world solutions, e.g., large reinforced concrete structures. They rely on donor funding 
and are forced to contract out the work. This way of doing business is unrealistic in most 
cases, unsustainable on a large scale, and does not address the true scope of the ERW 
problem.  
While it is admirable that efforts are made to make improvised protective 
structures, they often cause more harm then good. When makeshift ERW storage 
facilities are constructed, they can foster a false sense of security. They are often 
immediately overstocked with ERW, which renders what little if any, protection they 
originally offered. 
An appropriate, and sustainable ERW management solution is immediately 
required at the lowest levels that is simple, scalable and in line with UN CCW protocols 
and Mine/UXO awareness programs. Additionally, as national and international ERW 
disposal efforts expand to reach previously isolated ERW affected populations, the 
desired ERW management solution should facilitate recording, collation and disposal 
                                                 
26 The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), “Publications: A Guide to 
Ammunition Storage,” November 2008, http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/publications/Ammunition-
Storage-2008.pdf. 
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operation prioritization, which in turn, will greatly diminish the need for costly and time-
consuming UN mandated ERW and landmine surveys required to move disposal efforts 
forward.27 
 
                                                 
27 United Nations, “ International Guidelines for Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance Awareness 
Education,” 1. 
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III. DESIGN REQUIREMENTS  
A. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS BASED ON CURRENT DEFICIENCY 
1. What Is Required? 
A system or structure is required that provides safe, secure, temporary storage of 
ERW at the village level. The system or structure must be scalable, readily available, and 
once constructed, clearly marked and easily accessible to the local ERW affected 
population. The system or structure must provide an acceptable level of security to 
prevent theft of the stored ERW. The system or structure must be easily constructed by 
affected populations using locally sourced building materials at little to no cost to the 
local population.  
2. What Function Must Be Accomplished? 
a. Primary 
Provide secure storage for ERW items or abandon IEDs to prevent the 
ERW from entering into the IED network, or the abandoned IED from reentering the IED 
cycle. Also, when exposed to harsh climates, or repeated swings in temperature, the 
exterior ERW casings rust and internal explosive chemical compounds are drastically 
sensitized, which makes the ERW susceptible to unintended detonation. Inherently, 






b. Secondary  
In the event of an unintended ERW or abandon IED detonation, the 
structure must stop all ordnance-produced primary fragmentation,28 while eliminating or 
creating minimal secondary fragmentation29 from the structure itself or the surrounding 
area.30 
The system or structure should redirect the thermal effects and blast 
overpressure wave away from the population and mitigate its effects as close as possible 
to a K-Factor of 24. A K-Factor of 24 or K-24 (31 ft. or 9 m) is the minimum distance 
allowed between an individual and an l lb. TNT equivalent explosive detonation without 
receiving life threatening or disabling injuries, such as lung or ear drum ruptures.31 As 
per Department of Defense (DoD) Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards Manual 
(6055.9-STD), personnel protection must limit incident blast overpressure to 2.3 psi (15.9 
kPa).32 
3. What Must Be Accomplished To Completely Alleviate The 
Deficiency? 
To alleviate the effects of an unintended item detonation completely, the 
structure must completely stop all ordnance-produced fragmentation without creating any 
secondary fragmentation from the structure itself or the surrounding area. The system or 
structure should completely redirect the thermal effects and blast overpressure wave 
away from the population to mitigate its effects to a maximum K factor of 24 (24 ft). The 
structure must also completely secure the ERW from theft. While these parameters are  
 
                                                 
28 Primary fragmentation results from the shattering of the ordnance item vessel, such as shell casings 
or other containers used in the manufacture of ordnance or IEDs. Primary fragments are usually small, and 
initially travel at thousands of feet per second, and remain lethal for long distances. 
29 Secondary fragmentation is usually debris picked up by the explosion from the surrounding area 
that has an impact energy of 58 ft-lb. or greater.  
30 Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, 
“DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards 6055.9-STD,” October 5, 2004, 26–27. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 42. 
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obviously achievable in the developed world, the resources required to provide this 
capability at the village level throughout the undeveloped and developing world are not 
available. 
4. Why Must The Function Be Accomplished? 
ERW is a global problem currently without a realistic near-term management 
solution. The ERW management gap is allowing ERW to remain a threat and hindrance 
to global development. The ERW-CP will function to eliminate or drastically reduce 
civilian casualties from ERW awaiting disposal.  
5. When Must The Function Be Accomplished? 
To address the identified management challenge associated with ERW storage, 
the ERW management gap needs to be met between discovery and proper disposal. 
Despite tremendous global efforts, ERW remains a constant daily threat to life and limb. 
As no silver bullet solution exists to the ERW problem, any solution that can immediately 
mitigate the negative effects of ERW and is readily availably at the local level is, by 
definition, appropriate technology and should be implemented. 
6. Where and for How Long Must the Function Be Accomplished? 
The system or structure must be available at the village or lowest level where 
ERW affects the population. The intent of the system or structure is not to provide long-
term storage of ERW. The intent is to provide expedient short-term storage of ERW 
awaiting proper disposal. However, the capacity for long-term storage of ERW is 
required in the event disposal operations are delayed.  
As national and international ERW disposal efforts expand to reach previously 
isolated populations; the ERW solution will facilitate the recording, collation and 




7. How Many Times Must These Functions be Accomplished? 
The number of structures required is based on the scope of the ERW 
contamination problem in the local area. Also associated is proper disposal operation 
frequency, or lack thereof. The greater the level of ERW contamination, combined with 
disposal operation scarcity, will require more structures.  
Unfortunately, due to inaccuracies and incomplete data, no solid numbers relating 
to the frequency of discovery to the period of storage for ERW exist. However, “The data 
available on the casualties of ERW and percentage of UXO cleared again shows a greater 
bias toward the two main groups—anti-personnel mines and cluster bomblets 
(submunitions).”33 Fortunately, these types of munitions fall directly within the design 
requirements associated with explosive weight and size.  
In the event of an unintended ERW detonation, the system or structure is expected 
to receive catastrophic damage and will be considered no longer usable. As such, the 
structure’s design and construction methodology parameters must allow for replacement 
structures to be quickly constructed using locally sourced building materials at little to no 
cost to the local population.  
                                                 
33 The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, “Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), 
“A Threat Analysis,” 2002, 17. 
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IV. COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES  
A. DESIGN APPROACHES 
1. Commercially Available Solutions 
A broad spectrum of existing ERW storage solutions is available. As these 
solutions are examined, they are evaluated along the following spectrum. At the high end 
of the spectrum reside large-scale, high cost solutions that provide 100 percent security 
and protection from any explosive-related accident. At the opposite end of the spectrum 
reside the lower cost, smaller scale solutions designed to simply mitigate the effects of 
ammunition and explosive incidents. 
2. Large Capacity Structures 
a. Performance/Effectiveness 
It is not really necessary to go into detail describing the performance and 
effectiveness of large-scale, purpose built, reinforced concrete ammunition and explosive 
storage facilities. DoD publication 6055.9-STD Ammunition and Explosive Storage 
Safety Standards establishes uniform safety standards applicable to ammunition and 
explosives storage in the developed world. These standards are designed to provide 
maximum protection to personnel and property exposed to the damaging effects of 
ammunition and explosives accidents during development, manufacturing, testing, 
transportation, handling, storage, maintenance, demilitarization, and disposal. The 
recommended structures range from relatively small, above ground, stand-alone 
structures designed to hold under 100 lbs. of ordnance to earth covered, multi-unit 
complexes housing hundreds of thousands of pounds of ordnance.34  
 
                                                 
34 Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, 




Figure 1.   Earth-covered magazines 
b. Logistics/Maintenance 
The robust nature of the facilities required to meet the DoD standards 
obviously require tremendous resources to design, test and build. Additionally, these 
facilities require significant levels of backside support to ensure performance levels are 
maintained over the course of their service life.   
At $50,000 for a small 24’ X 10’ X 8’ pre-fabricated earth covered 
magazine, the cost is significant. Thus, large built-onsite magazines run into the millions  
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of dollars.35 Unfortunately, not enough of these types of adequately maintained facilities 
exist even in the more developed nations of South America, former Easter-Bloc, Asian, 
and African countries.  
The lack of facilities often leads to existing structures being overstocked 
with incompatible explosive items. These circumstances, in turn, lead to catastrophic 
incidents. Unfortunately, the data relating undesired explosive events or incidents to 
improper storage and management is limited. As stated, over half these incidents were 
not reported, or did not have an accurate report done for the types of ordnance or the 
NEW of the incident. The 23 incidents that did submit a report estimated the NEW at 
over 33,203 tons.36  
Even on the smallest scales and with construction assistance from the 
developed world, the facilities still need to be managed properly by qualified personnel. 
Furthermore, the sheer number of facilities required to address the scale of the ERW 
management problem effectively in the undeveloped and developing world makes first 
world, large capacity storage facilities an unrealistic option.  
3. Containment Devices and Structures 
a. Advanced EOD Storage Magazine (EODMAG), ARMAG 
Corporation 
(1) Performance/Effectiveness. The EODMAG is one example 
of many portable explosive magazines designed to meet the needs of small forward 
deployed military units and specific law enforcement situations. The EODMAG was 
design and developed by Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWS) Weapons Division, China 
Lake for EOD forces. The design was intended to fill a need for a deployable explosives 
storage magazine with a minimal Explosive Safety Quantity-Distance (ESQD). The 
system is a steel box of varying sizes from 42” X 42” X 36” to 7’ X 7’ X 7’. The design 
uses a modified off-the-shelf ARMAG Corporation magazine to provide additional 
                                                 
35 U.S. General Services Administration, “GSA Advantage,” May 1, 2012, 
https://www.gsaadvantage.gov/advantage/catalog/product_detail.do?gsin=11000010647450. 
36 The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, ed. Jack Glattbach, “Explosive 
Remnants of War (ERW)–Undesired Explosive Events in Ammunition Storage Areas,” 36–37. 
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venting and 17 individual pumice-lined containers designed to prevent sympathetic 
detonation and limit the maximum credible event (MCE) in the magazine to 1.25 pounds 
NEW of C-4. The maximum NEW permitted in the magazine is 128.24 pounds. NAWS 
China Lake Test Report NAWCWD TM 833137 defines all conditions and modifications 
associated with use of the Advanced EOD Magazine.38 
 
 
Figure 2.   EODMAG 
(2) Logistics/Maintenance. Aside from regular exterior care, 
such as painting to prevent rust, little to no maintenance is required. A 10-foot area clear 
of debris and vegetation is required around the EODMAG to meet DoD standards. 
However, the initial price of the unit and transportation requirements drives deployment 
costs for this solution over $10,000 U.S. each. Additionally, in the event of an unintended  
 
                                                 
37 NAWS China Lake Testing Facility, “NAWS China Lake Test Report TM 8331, DDESB TP 15, 
VER 2.0,” U.S. Navy, 2004. 
38 ARMAG Corp., “Explosive Ordnance Disposal Magazines,” May 9, 2011, 
http://www.armagcorp.com/explosives-magazines/eod. 
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explosion, the special pumice-lined containers within the unit would require replacement 
as a reoccurring cost.39 These factors render the various configurations of the EODMAG 
too expensive to deploy as a locally viable solution.  
b. “Bomb Container,” Beijing Yingruida Technology Development 
Co. 
(1) Performance/Effectiveness. The readily available 
information about Yingruida Technology Development Co. Products is limited. The 
specifications for the “Bomb Container” are as follows, “Be designed to store the 
explosives. Widely used in subway station, exhibition center, airport and railway stations. 




Figure 3.   Bomb container 
 
                                                 
39 Paul J. Mahoney, “Cost Comparative Analysis of Blast Mitigation Technologies with Regard to 
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW),” (MBA Project, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 17. 




(2) Logistics/Maintenance. No maintenance requirements are 
listed; however, basic exterior maintenance can be assumed. It also appears to be a one-
time use system, at an advertised price of $30,000 to $35,000 U.S. With no official 
technical specifications, the concept seems sound but unproven and outrageously 
expensive. However, they have been widely deployed throughout China’s subway 
systems.  
c. JAYCOR Small Blast Containment Device 
(1) Performance/Effectiveness. The Jaycore blast containment 
device is not currently available. However, the design is unique and stands in contrast to 
the steel containment systems. The Jaycor container dimensions are 2ft x 2ft x 2ft, and it 
weighs about 55 lbs. It can be transported in the back of a vehicle, and easily carried by 
one or two people. The system is designed to contain the blast and fragmentation of a 
pipe bomb containing at least 1 lb. of black or smokeless powder. By comparison, it is 
the equivalent to a small mortar containing less than half of a pound of plastic 
explosive.41 If increased protection against fragmentation is required, additional panels of 
varying degrees of thickness can be inserted. The Jaycor design is based on the 
lightweight, blast-resistant cargo container Jaycor has developed for the Federal Aviation 
Administration to contain the force of the blast and fragments from a bomb placed in 
checked luggage. 
To achieve the desired structural integrity to weight ratio, the 
Jaycor container design utilizes man-made fibers found in ballistic armor. Although not 
specifically mentioned, it can be assumed that the material is Kevlar or a similar material. 
Unfortunately, this design has limitations regarding the opening. Putting an ordinary 
opening on a container, such as the Jaycor device, negates most of the strengths inherent 
in the design. To overcome this deficiency, Jaycor developed an opening design that 
                                                 
41 National Counterterrorism Center, “TNT Equivalents for Various Explosives and Fuel-Air 
Mixtures,” May 1, 2012, http://www.nctc.gov/site/technical/tnt.html. 
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allows the container to be built with nearly the optimum blast resistant capacity allowed 
by the material, while maintaining a fully functioning opening.42 
 
Figure 4.   Jaycor small blast containment device 
(2) Logistics/Maintenance. As this system is currently 
unavailable, no logistical requirements are available. Due to the nature of the design, 
specifically, the use of man made high strength fibers, it can be assumed the cost of this 
onetime use device is considerable. Additionally, the design parameters of a highly 
portable device also make it susceptible to theft. However, the use of fiber-based 
materials to construct and reinforce the structure presents a valuable design option. 
4. Mitigation Vessels 
Mitigation devices are intended to stop horizontal fragmentation and redirect or 
mitigate the blast and thermal effects of an explosive detonation.  The design and intent 
of mitigation vessels begins realistically to address the requirements needed to address 
the ERW management gap. Testing mitigation vessels is quite different than containment 
devices and structures.  
Mitigation is an open-ended term specifically used to describe the effectiveness of 
a variety of vessel designs in a variety of situations and environments. Just as 
                                                 
42 H. H. Klein and M. J. Vander Vorst, “Containment Devices for Small Terrorist Bombs for Law 
Enforcement, Final,” National Institute for Justice, Office of Comptroller, 1999.  
 26
containment device effectiveness and capacity fall along a spectrum, so it is for 
mitigation vessels. The following section explores mitigation techniques from design 
specific vessels to supplementary mitigation products.  
a. Vorsphere 
(1) Performance/Effectiveness. Although advertised as a 
containment structure, the Vorsphere does not contain the blast; it simply redirects the 
effects upward, which places it in the mitigation category. The primary objective of the 
Vorsphere is to provide a re-usable explosive device mitigation system, in varying sizes, 
that does not need to be secured to the ground or a transport unit. Additionally, variations 
of the Vorsphere are designed and intended to be cost effective as a disposable unit or a 
reusable device. 
The Vorsphere manufacturing design is metal or a composite 
material dependent on requirements. The design requirements also expressed the 
Vorsphere be easy to manufacture, repaired in the field if necessary, and require minimal 
skill to transport and operate. The dimensions range from a 28” X 27” steel semi-sphere 
rated up to 1.4-2kg, 3-4.4 lbs. of C4, to a 60” X 59” steel semi-sphere rated up to 6-8kg 
13.2-17.6 lbs. of C4. 
 
  
Figure 5.   Vorsphere mitigation device 
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(2) Logistics/Maintenance. Individual unit prices range from 
the disposable version at 75 lbs. and a cost of roughly $871 U.S. to 533 lbs. at a cost of 
roughly $14,367 U.S. Initially, aside from the cost, the design parameters seem 
promising. The Vorspher’s capacity to mitigate and explosion is very impressive. While 
the size and weight of the larger units limit the probability of theft, the smaller devices 
are still susceptible. Also, none of the systems provide a way to secure items inside the 
device. The absence of a lid also leaves any items placed in the vessel exposed to the 
elements. The design demonstrates a purely detonation mitigation requirement not a 
storage requirement.  
According to the manufacture, no maintenance requirements, other 
than the assumed removal of water from the collection bin after it rains, are necessary. 
b. Bomb Resistant Trash Cans 
(1) Bomb Resistant Waste Receptacles, American Innovations, 
Inc. 
 Performance/Effectiveness. The bomb resistant waste receptacle is 
designed for deployment in urban areas as an explosive mitigation tool. Its 
triple wall construction is designed and tested to withstand various net 
explosive weights placed in multiple locations within the receptacle. The 
design parameters are as follows: containing all horizontal fragmentation 
from devices placed bottom center, sidewall weld seam, sidewall opposite 
weld seam, and midpoint. The exterior materials, galvanized edges, walls 
and drains provide corrosion resistance in most environments. The device 
is 29” in diameter and 37.5” high. It requires leveling, and anchoring with 
a single point stainless steel anchor resistant to over 4,000 pounds of shear 
or tension force.  
The following is directly from the manufactures website. 
In order to create a real life deployment scenario, all receptacles must be 
anchored to a 1” steel slab that is anchored to 6” concrete slab that is 
anchored to another 1” steel slab. Testing should be conducted with C4 
explosives, packed to a specific density in order to ensure an accurate 
TNT rating was obtained.  
Since we can not control where within a trash receptacle an explosive 
device will be placed, the following tests: bottom center, side wall weld 
seam, side wall opposite weld seam, and midpoint center detonations are 
all required for determining an accurate explosive containment rating.  
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Fragmentation tests should also be conducted using pipe bombs.  
Results for determining a successful test:  
Outer wall of receptacle did not breach (split, open, or crack).  
All horizontal fragmentation contained within the receptacle.  
Top to the receptacle did not fragment and detach during explosion. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Bomb resistant waste receptacles 
 Logistics/Maintenance. The logistics requirements of a seemingly simple 
system are surprisingly demanding. Weighing in at 1,400 lbs., this system 
requires custom designed lifting tools. Although the tools are provided 
with every order, moving and installing these receptacles requires heavy 
lifting equipment. The base cost is $2,297.10 each. However, when 
transportation and instillation is factored in, the cost per unit increases 
significantly. Additionally, in the event of a detonation, the structural 
integrity is compromised and the unit must be replaced. According to the 
website, minimal maintenance is required. However, the design is 
intended for an urban environment to be used as a trash can. As pointed 
out with previous blast mitigation systems, there is no lid, which 
significantly limits the design, and does not allow for storage or the 




                                                 
43 American Innovations, Inc., “Bomb Resistant Waste Receptacles,” May 10, 2012, 
http://www.bombreceptacles.com. 
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(2) BlastGard MTR, Models 91 and 101, BlastGard 
International. 
 Performance/Effectiveness. A very similar product to the AI waste 
receptacle is the more robust BlastGards MTR 91,101,300. While the 
previous product deals with horizontal fragmentation, it does not address 
the blast and thermal effects. BlastGard has implemented two unique 
design features to address the blast and thermal effects of an explosive 
detonation, a lid and use of Perlite. Perlite is a volcanic glass in gradual 
form that effectively absorbs blast, and extinguishes thermal effects. 
Testing on the BlastGard series was conducted in the same manner as 
other mitigation vessels, however, “Due to the sensitive nature of this 
technology, BlastGard International will not publicize explosives 
containment ratings of our MTR models.”44 The lid, like traditional 
trashcan’s lids, provides the contents limited protection from the elements, 
and if lockable, limited security.  
 
                        
Figure 7.   BlastGard 91, 101, 300 
 Logistics/Maintenance. Again, the logistical and maintenance 
requirements are extremely demanding and expensive. Weighing in at 
approximately 2,500 lbs., many of the same transportation hurdles exist. 
Although lifting hardware is provided, heavy lifting equipment is still 
required. The base price for a single unit starts at $4,602.00 U.S. It is 
unclear if, in the event of a large detonation, the structural integrity is 
compromised and the entire unit must be replaced. Additional 
maintenance expenses and logistical requirements are replacement parts. 
The replacement BlastGard MTR cover, inside top protective shield, side 
and bottom BlastWrap inserts are $1,500 U.S. per set, and replacement 
plastic liners are $80 U.S. each.  
                                                 
44 Blastgard International Inc., “Blastgard International Inc. Products,” May 10, 2008, 
http://www.blastgardintl.com/bp_mtr.html. 
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c. Bomb Basket 
(1) Performance/Effectiveness. The Bomb Basket is a generic name 
for several variations of the same device originating in India. The Bomb Basket’s design 
is very rudimentary. Its tube enclosure is manufactured from ballistic fiberglass woven 
composite with a gel coat finish. The manufacturer claims that the Bomb Basket can 
mitigate the effects of, and contain the fragments from a 200 grams (or .44 lbs.) RDX-
45based explosive device. The vented removable inner bag is made of a fire retardant 
nylon net and keeps the item centered in the vessel as best as possible.  
 
 
Figure 8.   Blast basket 
(2) Logistics/Maintenance. At 36” X 24” X 1¼” thick and 110 
lbs., the logistical requirements are significantly less than the previous mitigation 
techniques. The one time use unit cost is unknown. However, as noted, at .44 lbs., it has 
limited mitigation capability and applications. On an additional note, no “official” test 
results exist, which renders any and all claims unsubstantiated . 46 
d. Blast Wrap, Blastgard International 
(1) Performance/Effectiveness. BlastWrap is a blast mitigation 
product designed to be wrapped around or conform to any shape. BlastWrap is made 
                                                 
45 RDX is an explosive compound similar to C-4. 
46 Magnaera, “Bomb Basket,” May 10, 2010, http://www.magnaera.com/bomb_basket.htm. 
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from two laminated films formed into pockets containing blast reducing filler materials 
including volcanic glass bead (vermiculite) or other materials, and a blend of 
extinguishants designed to mitigate all blast and thermal effects of an explosion. 
BlastWrap works by mitigating blast wave energy by rapidly extinguishing the thermal 
output of an explosion, integrated into one of two basic categories, barriers or containers. 
BlastWrap is a passive blast and thermal mitigation technique that can be used in 
confined and unconfined spaces, but is obviously, not a fragmentation mitigation product. 




Figure 9.   BlastWrap 
(2) Logistics/Maintenance. The logistic and maintenance 
requirements are minimal for this product. It can be shipped anywhere in the world with 
relative ease. However, it is a one-time use product and will need to be replaced in the 
event of an unplanned detonation. Cost will depend on the level of mitigation required 
and the number of mitigation vessels required in relation to ERW contamination levels. 
Based on these variables, and the initial price of $71.25 US per sq. ft., the initial cost and 
subsequent replacement costs become significant. A small four-foot by four-foot box 
completely lined with Blastwrap would cost $6840.00 U.S., not including the materials 
used to construct the box. 
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5. Improvised Mitigation Techniques and Solutions 
Improvised solutions realistically address the requirements needed to bridge the 
ERW management gap. Testing improvised mitigation solutions, if at all possible, is 
quite different than containment devices or commercially available mitigation vessels. 
Improvised mitigation devices are intended to stop horizontal fragmentation and or lessen 
the blast and thermal effects of an explosive detonation. Just as containment devices and 
mitigation vessel, effectiveness and capacity fall along a spectrum; improvised mitigation 
techniques and solutions fall along an even broader spectrum. 
a. Sandbag Bunker and Earth Berms  
(1) Performance/Effectiveness. Sandbag mitigation techniques 
are widely used to minimize fragmentation, blast, and thermal effects of an explosion, 
and are often used by EOD personnel to dispose of an ordnance item in place. 
Additionally, they can be modified to provide temporary storage of ERW.  According to 
EOD manuals, the following technique is limited to munitions up to 155mm (6”) in 
diameter, which typically contain approximately 15 lbs. of high explosive.  
The preferred construction material is fabric woven, polypropylene 
sandbags filled with clean dry sand, as wet sand may produce voids within the sandbag. 
Shown in Figure 10, four walls of identical thickness are constructed around the munition 
or device. The thickness of the wall is determined by the diameter and assumed NEW of 
the item. An air gap of 6 inches between the munition and the inside face of each wall 
and ceiling should be maintained. The interior face of each wall must be vertical and the 
outside must have a 1:6 slope.47 
                                                 
47 Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division, “Protection of Personnel and Property,” 
U.S. Navy, Indian Head, MD, 2012, 47. 
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Figure 10.   Sandbag mitigation technique 
(1) Logistics/Maintenance. This technique is simple, and it is 
quite effective. However, logistical hurdles need to be overcome.  Although scalable, it 
requires a significant footprint for a single item, and acquiring a sufficient amount of 
sandbags and sand in remote locations may become an issue. In the spirit of 
improvisation, woven rice or grain bags and local sandy soil could be used as a substitute. 
The required modifications needed to store ERW within the structure are minimal. 
However, with the addition of an opening, the ability to mitigate the effects of an 
explosion is greatly reduced. To compensate, an additional sandbag structure just outside 
the door is required. Additionally, this modified technique leaves the ERW exposed to 
the elements and theft.   
Earth berms are in essence a continuous, circular dirt pile 
surrounding the item working in the same way as a sandbag bunker minus the top or roof. 
Earth berms require an even larger footprint and usually require a larger work force or 
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heavy equipment to facilitate construction. Since they are not an enclosed structure, it is 
not possible to provide sufficient protection from the elements or secure items from theft.  
b. Tires  
(1) Performance/Effectiveness. Tires have been used 
extensively throughout the undeveloped and developing- world to mitigate blast effects, 
from basic stacks of car tires to large truck tires modified into “Bomb Baskets.” The 
inherent properties of a modern tire make a logical protective material; steel belted 
reinforced rubber with a cylindrical shape. Unfortunately, explosive reactions take the 
path of least resistance48 and will escape through any gap, or expand into any crack or 
crevice of which a stack of tires has many. However, something is better than nothing.  
Theoretically, based on surface area and thickness, the larger the 
tires are, the more protection they will provide from horizontal fragmentation. Wider tires 
will stack higher with fewer tiers, and as such, eliminates gaps. Additionally, the more 
space an explosive reaction has to expand, the less powerful it becomes. Semi-truck tires 
and heavy equipment tires usually have 20” or greater rim diameters and even larger 
interior spaces allowing for greater expansion.  
(2) Logistics/Maintenance. No logistical “requirements” exist 
because this approach uses readily available materials. This technique, while not reliable 
or necessarily effective, is a perfect example of doing what you can, with what you have, 
where you are, when you have to. It falls directly into the design parameters and 
requirements of dealing with the global ERW problem on the appropriate level and scale. 
Figure 11 is an example from the Philippines of a single large tire mitigation technique. 
Although ingenuitive, it does not provide an ERW-management solution.  
                                                 




Figure 11.   Improvised “Bomb Basket” in Southern Luzon, Philippines 
B. PREFERRED APPROACH 
1. Hybrid Approach 
The hybrid approach can be described as a state of the art design concept that 
utilizes undeveloped/developing-world construction materials and methodology. Using 
this method, performance and effectiveness criteria are limited to the material used, not 
the design.  
Since man transitioned from nomadic tribes to sedentary farming, numerous 
building materials and construction techniques have developed throughout the world, that 
utilize the most appropriate materials available in the region. By referencing existing 
studies and running robust materials testing simulations on a myriad of locally used 
building materials and techniques, a suitable design or series of designs can be developed 
and implemented. The intent is to use local building materials; therefore, the design will 
need to make limited to nonexistent logistics and maintenance requirements a main 
priority. In other words, it needs to simple and hassle free. 
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V. IMPLEMENTATION 
A. DISTRIBUTION AND DEPLOYMENT 
1. Global Problem, Global Requirements 
The ERW problem is a global problem, and will require globally deployable 
solutions. As this makes it desirable for the design concept proposed, as a solution, it 
must be presented in a universally exportable format. This concept can be accomplished 
digitally via the Internet, which now reaches even into the most undeveloped parts of the 
world, as well as good old fashion hard copy paper and ink, and person-to-person 
exchanges via the numerous international initiatives to combat the ERW problem.  
B. MISSION PROFILES AND SCENARIOS: KNOWLEDGE DELIVERY 
PLATFORMS 
1. International Aid 
As discussed in the introduction, efforts across the spectrum of International Aid 
attempt to address the ERW problem. From robust national Mine/UXO awareness 
programs, to multilateral military programs, to the most benign aid organizations, they all 
face the same problems. The “Don’t touch it, mark it, report it”49 mantra, while targeting 
the lowest common denominator, is idealistic and unrealistic if no reliable reporting and 
or disposal capacity exists.  
Any of these efforts would benefit from the development of universal, cost 
effective ERW mitigation and management solutions. However, money and technology 
alone cannot fix the ERW problem. The age-old adage of teaching an individual to fish 
rather than giving them a fish must be implemented, which must be accomplished 
through the implementation of appropriate solutions at the appropriate levels. Proposed 
solutions must be transferable to the lowest levels of interaction, and subsequent levels of 
assistance/aid, while adhering to the global Mine/UXO awareness programs.  
                                                 
49 United Nations, “International Guidelines for Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance Awareness 
Education.” 
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2. U.S. Military Efforts 
a. U.S. DoD Humanitarian Demining Program (HD) 
U.S. forces deployed to host nations cannot actively conduct demining 
operations, e.g., searching for and digging mines out of the ground. However working, 
by, with, and through partner nations, demining aid in all other forms may be provided. 
One such avenue is through research and development. The HD R&D Program focuses 
on developing and testing demining tactics, techniques and procedures that increase the 
safety and efficiency of demining operations. HD R&D adapts commercial-off-the-shelf 
technologies (COTS), uses mature technologies, or leverages existing military 
technologies to meet the challenges that face landmine affected populations and deminers 
in mine and minefield detection, area reduction, vegetation clearance, mechanical mine 
clearance and mine neutralization. Currently, their focus is not specifically on ERW 
storage. However, ERW mitigation does fall under their purview.50  
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations & 
Low Intensity Conflict (OASD SO/LIC) provides policy guidance and oversight for HD. 
OASD SO/LIC reviews and approves requests for in-country field assessments and 
operational field evaluations, and is also responsible for communicating with the U.S. 
Department of State’s humanitarian demining efforts.51 Under this structure, the ERW-
CP concept could be widely shared and field evaluations could begin immediately.  
b. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 
Once approved, the ERW-CP concept can be implemented through U.S. 
FID efforts via Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) programs. The U.S. FID 
mission is to support a host nation’s internal defense and development via a full range of 
actions and programs. Of these programs, the HCA, allows for the development of 
medical facilities, the drilling of wells, transportation projects and programs, basic 
                                                 
50 Once a landmine is discovered, recovered and rendered safe, it becomes an explosive remnant of 
war, and is no longer classified as an active landmine. 
51 U.S. Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining R&D Program, “Research and Development 
Program Overview,” May 31, 2012, http://www.humanitarian-
demining.org/2010Design/Program_Overview.asp. 
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construction and repairs to public facilities, and of course, the development of facilities 
and programs used in providing education concerning the detection and clearing of 
landmines and other explosive remnants of war.52 The nature of the ERW-CP concept 
falls directly into the framework and intent of the FID/HCA mission. 
c. Village Stability Operations (VSO) 
VSO are conducted primarily in Afghanistan and are intended to protect 
rural and remote populations, prevent intimidation and exploitation by insurgent forces, 
and increase security and stability in an area. Ultimately, VSO’s goal is to expand the 
influence of the Afghan government. Through implementation of bottom-up village and 
district defense systems, VSO complement top-down national-level Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF) development. “The goal of VSO is to empower and galvanize 
Afghans to stand up for themselves against insurgents and to generate Afghan solutions 
for Afghan problems.”53  
The VSO methodology is comprised of four phases: shape, hold, build, 
and expand/transition. Fundamentally, VSO is designed to take a conditions-based 
approach, scalable to the dynamic conditions faced in the various areas of responsibility 
and situations of stability operations. Unlike FID, U.S. personnel supporting VSO are 
embedded at the village level and are actively engaged in combat operations. 
During the second, or hold phase of VSO, emphasis is placed on 
protecting the population. The hold phase begins once the team has successfully 
embedded in the village and begins to develop a “stability bubble” around it. During this 
phase, Special Operations Forces train a contingent of Afghan Local Police (ALP) 
comprised of the local villagers. If an immediate security threat does not exist, a situation 
may occur in operations will focus on development while simultaneously bolstering 
                                                 
52 U.S. Department of Defense, DTIC, “Joint Publication 3-22 Foreign Internal Defense Operations,” 
July 12, 2010, VI–23. 
53 Headquarters Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan, Bagram Airbase, 
“Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police: Bottom-up Counterinsurgency,” 2011, 8. 
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levels of security.54 These operations often entail dealing with armed deployed 
landmines, deployed and abandon IEDs, UXO, and SA/LW weapons caches.55 
Unfortunately, due to the isolated areas in which VSO is often conducted, EOD forces are 
not always immediately available to dispose of these hazards, which forces U.S. and local 
personnel to find an alternative solution to the secure ERW storage problem. Based on 
these conditions, VSO provides a near perfect platform for the implementation of the 
ERW-CP concept.  
3. Aid Organizations 
The range and levels of NGOs and Intentional Aid Organizations (IAO) actively 
working to address the landmine and ERW global problem is astounding. The very nature 
of free flowing information inherent within the IAO allows for maximum proliferation of 
the ERW-CP concept. Often hindered by access to funding and logistical support, the 
design requirements of the ERW-CP were developed with all levels of aid in mind.  
4. Local Efforts 
As presented in Chapter II, village demining activities are becoming more 
frequent. Local populations lacking in formal training and access to the proper demining 
equipment are executing demining by necessity. As dissemination of the ERW-CP 
construction methodology does not require a national program, these local efforts would 
probably benefit the most from the ERW-CP concept.  
C. PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS 
1. Safety Requirements 
To be legitimately accepted by the international community as an explosive 
mitigation device, at a minimum, the structure must stop the lethal affects of ERW-
produced fragmentation without creating any secondary fragmentation from the structure 
                                                 
54 Headquarters Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan, Bagram Airbase, 
“Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police: Bottom-up Counterinsurgency.” 
55 With the exception of armed actively deployed landmines and IEDs, abandoned IEDs, UXO, and 
SA/LW weapons caches are all considered ERW. 
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itself or the surrounding area, which must be accomplished while redirecting the thermal 
effects and blast overpressure wave away from the population. The easiest way to provide 
protection from the effects of thermal and blast waves is distance. The greater the 
distance from the explosion, the less the negative effect, but to lessen the footprint 
required to provide an acceptable level of protection, the distance between collection 
points and populated areas needs to be minimal. The structure should provide protection 
from blast wave effects as close as possible to a K-Factor of 24. A K-Factor of 24 or K-
24 (31 ft. or 9 m) is the minimum distance an individual can be from a non-fragmentation 
producing an l lb. TNT equivalent explosive detonation without receiving life threatening 
injuries. As depicted in Figure 12, the lowest recommended distance for a one pound 
explosion is K-50 (15 meters or 50 ft.); however, this chart assumes that a single 
authority has complete control of the 50-ft. area and situation at all times. This distance is 
the absolute minimum emergency responders, such as trained EOD technicians, are 
allowed to remain and observe. It is assumed that in an uncontrolled environment, 
smaller protective distances are suggested.56 
                                                 
56 Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division, “Protection of Personnel and Property,” 
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Figure 12.   Excerpt from K-Factor chart 
Much like the limits of the sandbag mitigation technique, any ordnance item over 
6” in diameter will likely contain much more than 1 lb. of explosive. This being the case, 
only the most robust containment facilities will provide the required levels of protection 
and are outside the design parameters of this effort. However, distance is the best and  
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cheapest mitigation technique. For larger ordnance, such as 155mm projectiles and large 
anti-tank landmines, the structure can be placed at a much greater distance from the 
population and still act as an effective secure collection point. 
D. UTILIZATION REQUIREMENTS 
1. Access and Security 
The design concept is based at the lowest levels of expertise, and assumes that no 
training concerning ERW, explosives, or proper ordnance handling exists. Therefore, the 
structure must be clearly marked and easily accessible to untrained personnel, while 
providing secure storage for ERW. Due to lack of training, structures will be limited to 2 
lbs. NEW, or roughly two to three small items or maximum, one, six” diameter item to 
alleviate explosive compatibility issues and the tendency to stockpile ERW items. No 
doubt multiple structures in areas with high ERW concentrations will be required. Also, 
the ability to secure items will protect them from theft, tampering, as well as further 
deterioration from the elements.  
2. Adhering to International Guidelines for Landmine and Unexploded 
Ordnance Awareness Education 
To implement an ERW management and mitigation system properly, certain 
issues must be addressed. First, adherence to the UN’s “International Guidelines for 
Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance Awareness Education”57 programs must be 
maintained. Second, a simple, universally acceptable, procedure must be disseminated 
and implemented to get the ERW from the discovery site to be secured in the structure. 
First, the UN Mine/UXO awareness mantra “Don’t touch it, mark it, report it”58 
while idealistic, should be followed, which may seem contradictory to the concept of a 
locally managed ERW storage structure. However, an ERW structure is only needed 
when no reliable reporting system above the local authority exists or, even when 
reported, the capacity to dispose of the ERW in a timely manner is not available. To 
                                                 




adhere to the global Mine/UXO awareness programs, the ERW mitigation effort must 
hinge on following Mine/UXO awareness reporting procedures at the lowest levels of 
authority.  
Second, in accordance with Mine/UXO awareness efforts, after the ERW is 
discovered and marked, the discovering individual must report the incident to the local 
leader or whoever the local reporting authority is. It then falls upon that local leader to 
determine an acceptable course of action. If a reporting system above the local level has 
been established but is unable to respond in what that local leader deems an effective 
timeframe, the leader has an alternative if aware of the ERW-CP concept. Once it is 
determined by the empowered local leader that action must be taken, this individual 
assumes the risk, and thus, a simple line pull procedure59 and wait time can be 
preformed. After a successful line pull procedure, the ERW can then be transported to 
and secured within the structure. 
E. EFFECTIVENESS REQUIREMENTS 
1. Cost-Based  
Due to the scope of the ERW problem, a universally inexpensive, preferably free, 
easily constructed and reproducible structure must be designed. Based on these 
parameters, local building materials and techniques must be used. Local building 
materials vary as drastically as the global environment; however, salient alternatives are 
available across the globe. As the building materials become less important, the concept 
of design becomes the nucleus of effort. The design must be based on proven blast 
mitigation concepts adapted from materials that exist naturally or are available nearly 
everywhere. Reinforced concrete and man-made, high-strength fibers are the optimal 
choice. However, using readily available or naturally occurring materials that reasonably  
 
                                                 
59 A “line pull” is a procedure used to remotely move or disturb UXO from a safe distance from under 
frontal and overhead protection. The procedure consists of evacuating the area surrounding the UXO of 
personnel. Secondly, without moving it, a line is tied to the UXO. Once the line is around the UXO, the 
individual backs out to the predetermined safe distance and takes frontal and overhead cover. The 
individual then forcefully pulls the UXO several feet from its original resting place and waits one hour. If 
the UXO does not detonate, and is deemed safe to move, it can be transported. 
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replicate the same properties should be used if these materials are the only ones available. 
These alternative materials, such as hemp, sugar cane, and coir (coconut husk), are 
explored in the Technical Performance Measures chapter. 
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VI. LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE CONCEPT  
A. LOGISTICS 
Ideally, minimal logistic requirements will be necessary. By adhering to design 
requirements, the local labor force using locally sourced building materials should be 
able to implement the design concept in place. In cases in which direct aid is being 
provided by outside sources, procuring the building materials and hiring a local labor 
force is desired as opposed to purchasing a COTS mitigation solution or hiring an outside 
contractor to fabricate one.   
B. LEVELS OF MAINTENANCE 
1. Materials Based 
Maintenance should be negligible on the structure. In concert with design 
parameters, some form of water proofing, such as paint or a locally derived alternative, 
will be required. It is recommended that white or bright color paint be used not only as a 
warning, but to reduce the effects of radiant heat energy caused by ultraviolet rays. Also, 
the structure must be clearly marked as containing an explosive hazard. These markings 
will need to be maintained. An example of the international symbols for explosive 
hazards and mines is provided in Figure 13. 
 
   
Figure 13.   International explosive hazard symbols 
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C. REPAIR POLICIES 
1. Replacement 
The requirement is for an easy-to-construct local solution that can be produced as 
required when structures are expended or capacity exceeded. In the event of an 
unintended detonation, the structure will assumedly receive catastrophic damage and 
need to be completely replaced. If capacity is reached, such as one or two items, another 
structure must be built. 
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VII. TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
A. BUILDING MATERIAL REINFORCEMENT TECHNIQUES 
1. Introduction  
The structural properties set forth in the design requirements naturally lean toward 
a reinforced concrete structure. However, as stated, modern reinforced concrete structures 
are unrealistic due to material availability, logistical requirements and construction cost. 
Fortunately, valid substitutes to re-bar and synthetic fiber-reinforced concrete are 
available. 
Cements have been used in building materials for centuries. Using fibers to 
reinforce building materials is not a new concept either. Chopped straw has been used to 
reinforce mud bricks throughout their existence, while fibers like horsehair were used to 
reinforce masonry mortar and plaster. According to the American Concrete Institute 
(ACI), modern fibers, such as asbestos, were used in cement as far back as 1898, and are 
still widely used throughout the world today, despite their known health hazards. Patents 
using fibers to improve the properties of concrete through discontinuous steel 
reinforcement elements, such as nails, wire segments, and metal chips, date back to the 
early 1900s. 
Alternative fibers to asbestos were introduced throughout the 1960s and 1970s in 
a variety of building products and production techniques to enhance composite 
properties. Enhanced properties include tensile strength, compressive strength, elastic 
modulus, crack resistance, crack control, durability, fatigue life, resistance to impact and 






Unfortunately, initial attempts at using natural and synthetic fibers, such as hemp, 
coir, nylon and polypropylene, were not as successful as glass or steel fibers. However, 
methods of fabrication and a better understanding of fiber reinforcement have led 
researchers to believe that synthetic and natural fibers can effectively reinforce building 
materials.60 
2. Natural Fiber Reinforced Concrete (NFRC) Building Techniques 
Naturally occurring, discontinuous short cellulose fibers are widely used in Fiber 
Reinforced Concrete (FRC) all over the world. Termed natural fiber reinforced concrete 
(NFRC), its applications are numerous and include modern synthetically reinforced 
building materials. A myriad of natural reinforcing materials can be obtained at little cost, 
or for free, as agricultural byproducts using locally available manpower and technical 
expertise. Fibers, such as hemp and jute, are often used in the manufacture of low fiber 
content building materials and are typically referred to as unprocessed natural fibers 
(UNF).61 However, as the fiber content is increased, the material strength increases. The 
concept of using UNFs falls directly into the design requirements. A list of UNF and 
properties are covered later in this chapter. 
3. Synthetic Fiber Reinforced Concrete (SNFRC) Techniques 
A variety of fiber materials other than steel, glass, or natural fibers have been 
developed and used to reinforce building materials, most commonly concrete. These 
fibers are categorized as synthetic fibers and are used in cement products generally 
termed SNFRC. Some of these fibers have little reported research while others, such as 
polypropylene, are often found in commercial applications and have been tested 
extensively.  
Interest in synthetic fibers as a component of building materials was first reported 
in 1965. Synthetic monofilament fibers were used in blast resistant structures for the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers Research and Development Section. The fibers were roughly 
                                                 
60 ACI Committee 232, “Use of Raw or Processed Natural Pozzolans in Concrete, ACI 232.1R-00, 
American Concrete Institute, 2001, 2–3. 
61 Ibid., 57–58. 
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the same size and shape as the steel fibers, or Steel Fiber Reinforced Concrete (SFRC) 
and glass fibers, Glass Fiber Reinforced Concrete (GFRC), being tested. The fibers were 
one-half to one inch in length with a fiber aspect ratio (length to diameter, l/d) of between 
50 and 100. This project discovered that with the addition of small quantities, 0.5 percent 
by volume of synthetic fibers, the concrete composite’s ductility and impact resistance 
increased significantly.62 
Unfortunately, commercially available synthetic fibers are expensive, and hence, 
it can be assumed that they are not readily available throughout the world. However, the 
concept of using synthetic materials to reinforce the design’s building materials is still 
valid. Many synthetic materials can be found throughout the world as waste, such as 
plastic bags, water bottles, and discarded polypropylene rope that has reached the end of 
its service life. Theoretically, any of these or other man-made material with acceptable 
tensile strength could be used as a substitute or addition.  
B. FIBER REINFORCED BUILDING MATERIALS 
The ACI has a extensive collection of studies conducted on all aspects of cement 
building materials, from state-of-the-art synthetically reinforced concrete to alternative 
pozzolans, and natural fibers to soil cement properties. The entire scope of building 
materials can be applied to the alternatives required in the undeveloped and developing 
world building solutions set forth in the design requirements. 
1. Portland Cement, Pozzolans and Soil Cements 
Lime and limestone are among the oldest materials used by mankind for 
construction purposes, including the pyramids of Egypt. The oldest example of a 
hydraulic binder dates back to 5,000–4,000 B.C., and was a mixture of lime, a natural 
pozzolan and diatomaceous earth, roughly 3,000 years before the discovery of Portland 
cement in 1824.63  
                                                 
62 ACI Committee 544, “State-of-the-Art Report on Fiber Reinforced Concrete: ACI 544.1R-96,” 
American Concrete Institute, 2001, 39–40. 
63 ACI Committee 232, “Use of Raw or Processed Natural Pozzolans in Concrete, ACI 232.1R-00, 1. 
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Currently, Portland cement is the most commonly used and recommended 
building cements in common construction methodologies throughout the world. Several 
types of modern, common Portland cements exist: Portland blast furnace cement, 
Portland fly ash cement, Portland pozzolan cement, Portland silica fume cement and 
many others. Although Portland cement is readily available throughout the world, in very 
isolated areas, it may be very scarce or expensive. In the absence of readily available or 
inexpensive Portland cement, alternative pozzolans can be used to improve the qualities 
and volume of building materials. The nature of the ERW problem effects all 
environments, and therefore, all building materials and options should be taken into 
consideration.64 
A pozzolan is “...a siliceous or siliceous and aluminous material, which in itself 
possesses little or no cementitious value but will, in finely divided form and in the 
presence of moisture, chemically react with calcium hydroxide at ordinary temperatures 
to form compounds possessing cementitious properties.”65 
A natural Pozzolan is “...either a raw or calcined [heated] natural material that has 
pozzolanic properties (for example, volcanic ash or pumicite, opaline chert and shales, 
tuffs, and some diatomaceous earths).”66 Pozzolans used on an industrial scale, such as 
fly ash and silica fume, are artificial pozzolans produced from industrial processes. These 
pozzolans are still a viable option if available. The following is a discussion of some 
natural pozzolans produced in various parts of the world that would be suitable for use in 
the design of the structure. 
Santorin earth is produced from a natural deposit of volcanic ash of dacitic 
composition. Pozzolana is a pumice ash comprised of trachyte found in Italy. Trachyte is 
a volcanic rock comprised primarily of feldspar crystals in a matrix of siliceous glass. 
The deposit near Pozzuoli is the source of the term “pozzolan” given to all materials 
having similar properties. Rhenish trass, another pozzolan of volcanic origin, was used 
                                                 
64 ACI Committee 117, Standard Tolerances for Concrete Construction and Materials, ACI 117-90, 
American Concrete Institute, 1990, 2. 
65 ACI Committee 232, “Use of Raw or Processed Natural Pozzolans in Concrete, ACI 232.1R-00, 3. 
66 Ibid. 
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extensively throughout Roman times. The material is a volcanic ash found in Germany. 
Gaize is a pozzolan of porous sedimentary rock consisting mainly of opal. The material is 
usually calcined at high temperatures before used as a pozzolan for Portland pozzolan 
cement.67 
Metakaolin is a natural pozzolan produced by heating kaolin-containing clays that 
forces it to recrystallize, and turns it into mullite or spinel, another amorphous silica. 
Approximately 250,000 metric tons (227,300 tons) of locally sourced calcined kaolinitic 
clay was used in the construction of four hydroelectric dams in Brazil at approximately 
1/3 the cost of Portland cement.68 
Rice husk ash (RHA) is a pozzolan produced from burning rice husks, which are a 
byproduct produced during the agricultural processing of rice. Rice husks are 
approximately 50% cellulose, 30% lignin, and 20% silica. After the agricultural process, 
the remaining rice husks are incinerated, which leaves behind an ash consisting mainly of 
amorphous silica. Chemical analysis of fully burnt RHA shows that the amorphous silica 
content ranges between 90–96% and produces a highly active pozzolan. These 
characteristics make RHA suitable for making high-quality cement and concrete 
products. The benefits of using RHA are higher compressive strengths, decreased 
moisture permeability, resistance to sulfate attack, resistance to acid attack, reduction of 
surface cracking, resistance to chloride penetration, and outstanding performance under 
freezing-and-thawing cycling.69  
RHA is readily available throughout the undeveloped and developing-world 
where rice is grown and shows the most promise of filling the building materials design 
requirements.  
Soil cements are another readily available building material that can act as a 
suitable replacement for primarily cement-based building materials. As defined by the 
ACI, soil cements are “...a mixture of soil and measured amounts of Portland cement and 
                                                 
67 ACI Committee 232, “Use of Raw or Processed Natural Pozzolans in Concrete, ACI 232.1R-00, 4. 
68 Ibid., 6–7. 
69 Ibid., 6. 
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water compacted to a high density.”70 Soil cement is further defined as a blended, 
compacted and cured mixture of soil, aggregates/fibers, Portland cement, pozzolans, and 
water. The Portland cement bonds the soil and aggregates or fibers, but unlike concrete, 
the individual particles are not completely encapsulated by the Portland cement paste. 
Essentially, soil cement is a modern version of Adobe. Almost all types of soils can be 
used for soil cement. Exceptions include highly organic soils, highly plastic clays, and 
poorly reacting sandy soils. Its use is highly recommended in areas in which clay content 
in the soil is high, often where adobe construction is historically prominent.71 
Rammed earth is another name for soil cement used to construct walls. Rammed 
earth walls, like the ones predominantly found in Afghanistan, can be over two feet thick 
and can last for centuries. Rammed earth walls can be constructed by placing damp soil 
cement material into forms to make bricks. Or, more commonly, a wetter soil cement is 
placed or compacted in four to six inch thick layers or lifts. After setting and curing, the 
wall can be covered with stucco or simply painted. A typical rammed-earth/soil cement 
mix consists of 70% sand, 30% soil, and 4 to 15% cement by weight, with the average 
around 7%.72 With the addition of fiber reinforcements, the strength, and volume of soil 
cement building materials will increase significantly.  
2. Unprocessed Natural Fibers 
Mix proportions for UNF reinforced concrete “...cannot be generalized since there 
are a variety of natural fibers that can be used in conjunction with the other standard 
ingredients such as cement, pozzolans, fine aggregates, water, and admixtures.”73 
However, two methods of mixing and placing UNF reinforced building materials exist, 
wet mixing and dry-compacted mixing.  
In the wet mix, a low volume of fibers is used. The cement and water slurry is 
first added to any aggregates then the fiber is added to the slurry until proper consistency 
                                                 
70 ACI Committee 230, “State-of-the-Art Report on Soil Cement, ACI 230.1R-90,” American 
Concrete Institute, 1997, 2. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., 6. 
73 Committee 544, “State-of-the-Art Report on Fiber Reinforced Concrete: ACI 544.1R-96,” 61. 
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and workability is reached. In the dry-compacted mix, the amount of fiber used is about 
10 times that of the wet mix. The fibers are saturated with water then added to the cement 
and aggregates to reach the desired consistency. This mixing process can be done by 
hand.74 
The following table of naturally occurring fibers suitable for reinforcement is 
extensive, but not exhaustive. The list is comprised of fibers spanning the globe to 
demonstrate applicability and availability.  
 
S Bagasse  








Ramie (China grass 
cloth) 
Sisal (Often termed 
agave) 
Coir (fiber from the 
coconut shell) 
Palm Fiber Bamboo fiber Umbrella plant Milkweed 
Piña Abacá Cotton Kapok 
Bast fibers Nettles Esparto Bowstring Hemp 
Jute Kenaf Henequen Hemp 
Flax Hoopvine Elephant Grass Yucca (An agave) 
Water Reed Plantain Musamba Wood Fiber (kraft pulp) 
Maguey Lechuguilla Banana Leaf Guaney 
Table 1.   Natural fibers 
The following section explores a range of tested natural fibers from AIC’s Fiber 
Reinforced Concrete Report 544.1R-59. 
Coir, or coconut fibers, comprises the outer shell of the coconut called the husk. 
The husk has a hard skin and thick layer of fibers embedded in a soft material. Retting, 
the process used for extracting the fibers, or coir, is widely used in the undeveloped 
countries of the world. In more developed regions, it is common to use a mechanical  
 
                                                 
74 Committee 544, “State-of-the-Art Report on Fiber Reinforced Concrete: ACI 544.1R-96,” 60. 
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process to separate the fibers. Although coconut cultivation is often limited to the tropical 
regions of Africa, Asia, and Central America, these areas are some of the most widely 
affected by ERW. 
A considerable amount of research has been conducted on the use of sisal fibers to 
develop quality fiber reinforced concrete products on the industrial level. These fibers are 
stronger than most of the other natural fibers, as demonstrated in Table 2. 
Sugar cane is widely cultivated and used in both tropical and sub-tropical regions. 
Sugar cane bagasse is the material remaining after the extraction process and contains 
about 50% fiber and 30% pith with 20% other solids. To obtain suitable fibers, the pith 
and other solids are removed from the fibers. The properties of bagasse fibers depend on 
the variety of the sugar cane, and to a large extent, its maturity. However, the process is 
widely practiced through the region and is often done at the local level. The properties are 
also outlined in Table 2. 
Bamboo grows naturally and quickly in tropical and sub-tropical regions to a 
height of 50 ft. with diameters varying within the range of 1” to 4”. Dried bamboo stems 
are commonly used for building temporary structures wherever available. It is also used 
for continuous reinforcing, or a re-bar substitute, in concrete. Bamboo is also turned into 
fibers through a simple process often done at the local level. 
Flax is grown mainly for its fiber; both tensile strength and the modulus of 
elasticity are extremely high compared to those of other natural fibers. 
Jute is a fiber very similar to hemp and is also grown mainly for its fibers in 
central and Southeast Asia. Primarily used for making ropes and grain sacks, jute’s strong 
tension properties make it an excellent choice as fiber reinforcement. The process for 




Table 2.   Unprocessed natural fiber characteristics75 
3. Available Synthetic Fibers 
Variations of synthetic materials might be available as waste products such as any 
length of discarded rope, Polyethylene terephthalate (PET) from plastic bottles, or any 
readily shred-able plastic similar to PET or Polypropylene (PP). Although this option 
might not be applicable for very isolated regions affected by ERW, these waste items are 
often available in disaster relief humanitarian aid situations and anywhere U.S. or UN 
forces are present.  
To facilitate the shredding of the plastic, several simple machines and hand tools 
have been developed specifically for the undeveloped and developing-world to make use 
of these waste items. Of the hundreds of PET studies and PET fibers analyzed, one of 
studies states, “Applicable [PET] fibers with a length of 60-90 mm and width 1-2mm”76 
are ideal, which concurs with other studies and demonstrates these processed waste items 
                                                 
75 Committee 544, “State-of-the-Art Report on Fiber Reinforced Concrete: ACI 544.1R-96.” 
76 Vladimíra Vytlačilová, “The Fiber Reinforced Concrete With Using Recycled Aggregates,” 
International Journal of Systems Applications, Engineering & Development 5, no. 3 (2011): 363. 
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can be integrated in the construction methodology and possesses the same relative 
performance characteristics as industrial grade fibers.  
 
 









PET 1 28.67 3.07 - 2.61 
PET 2 27.36 3.23 - 2.57 
Table 3.   Selected mechanical-physical characteristics of the PET fiber reinforced 





Table 4.   Synthetic fibers characteristics77  
4. Reinforcements 
Like cements, natural wood and wood like materials, such as bamboo, have been 
used for centuries to build structures. Recently, extensive research has been done on 
using bamboo as a suitable replacement for structural steel concrete reinforcements, such 
as re-bar. Additionally, wood timbers of varying sizes have been used in Adobe 
structures and to reinforce rammed earth walls in places like Afghanistan for centuries.78 
The same structural properties that make these building materials desirable for structures, 
allow them to fit perfectly into the design requirements.  
Manmade products like tires, which are often a disposal problem even in the 
developing-world, can be re-used as structural reinforcement, and are already widely 
used as improvised protective works throughout the world. Also, any resilient manmade 
material that can be manipulated into the design framework falls within the design 
requirements, as long as the reinforcement itself is secured in the structure in a manner 
that does not allow it to become secondary fragmentation.  
                                                 
77 ACI Committee 544, “State-of-the-Art Report on Fiber Reinforced Concrete: ACI 544.1R-96.” 
78 Ibid., 66–67. 
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5. Dry Quenching Materials 
Dry quenching materials are not a structural design requirement, but as an 
attenuating material, it is of significant value to the overall ERW threat mitigation effort. 
Products, such as perlite and vermiculite, possess unique qualities that will significantly 
enhance the capability of any structural design. They are most commonly used as a 
lightweight aggregate in the construction industry and as soil amendments. Perlite and 
vermiculite are widely availably throughout the world and at little cost.79 The product 
BlastWrap mentioned in Chapter IV uses a mixture of chemicals absorbed into perlite 
and sealed into plastic cells to mitigate the effects of an explosion. Without violating the 
BlasWrap patent, the use of untreated, loose attenuating materials, such as perlite and 
vermiculite, are very useful in mitigating the effects of an explosion. By simply 
surrounding an item with the attenuating material, the blast wave and thermal effects of 
an explosion can be mitigated, as the material absorbs the shock of the explosion, it will 
decrease the velocity of any fragmentation and lessen its lethality.  
If these attenuating materials are not available, soil in small clumps or granules 
may be a suitable substitute. Also, rough or course fibrous material, such as unprocessed 
coconut husk, may be used to surround and stabilize the ERW. Any of the 
aforementioned fibrous materials will serve as suitable attenuating materials.  
C. MATHEMATICAL SIMULATION 
1. Introduction to the Simulation 
Based on the characteristics of cementious fiber reinforced building materials, the 
aforementioned building techniques fall within the design requirements. However, the 
required thickness of the structure walls still needed to be determined. Figure 15 displays 
the required thickness of 4,000 psi concrete needed to stop primary fragmentation 
perforation from various ordnance diameters and items. Although the ERW-CP will be 
constructed using materials resembling concrete, it will not be “4000 psi concrete.” Also,  
 
                                                 
79 Roskill, “Ultra-Light Weight Aggregates: Global Industry Markets and Outlook,” 1st. ed., 
September 31, 2011, http://www.roskill.com/reports/industrial-minerals/ultralightweight-aggregate. 
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these thicknesses are for the prevention of frag perforation at HFDR, which could be 
several hundred feet.80 By using a mathematical simulation, a baseline thickness was 
derived to begin field experimentation of the ERW-CP. 
 
 
Figure 15.   Minimal thickness of 4,000 psi concrete to stop primary fragmentation81 
A brief introduction to the materials, system and units used to conduct the 
simulation is required to understand the intent and results. The materials required to meet 
design requirements need to have high elastic modulus82 properties to “catch” 
fragmentation. They also need to be stiff enough to redirect the blast and thermal effects 
of an explosion. One way to test the physical properties of a material is Young’s 
modulus. Young’s modulus is a measure of the stiffness of an elastic material and is a 
                                                 
80 Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division, “Protection of Personnel and Property,” 
77. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Elastic modulus is the mathematical description of a substance’s tendency to be deformed elastically 
when a force is applied to it. The elastic modulus of an object is defined as the slope of its stress–strain 
curve in the elastic deformation region 
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quantity used to characterize materials. It is defined as the ratio of the uniaxial stress over 
the uniaxial strain in the range of stress in which Hooke’s Law83 holds. Young’s modulus 
can be experimentally determined from the slope of a stress-strain curve created during 
tensile tests conducted on a sample of the material.84  
The physical property data sets of the materials selected to run the simulation are 
on opposite ends of the materials performance spectrum. Shock absorbing concrete, the 
ideal material, on one end, and a material commonly referred to as Papercrete, on the 
other.  
2. Materials Tested 
The first data set comes from a study conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers. 
The study was done to determine the fragmentation collection properties of foamed fiber-
reinforced concrete or shock-absorbing concrete (SACON). Different versions of 
SACON were tested consisting of the synthetic fibers: stainless steel, polypropylene, and 
fiberglass. Once the fibers are added, the fiber reinforced concrete is then foamed to 
create persistent air bubbles that aid in absorbing shock.  
The cellular structure of this type of concrete permits incoming bullets and 
fragments to bury themselves in the concrete without producing ricochets. 
Recent work on using foamed concrete in firing ranges has also shown 
that thick blocks of SACON can resist penetration from fragment impacts 
that occur at a single point beyond what might be predicted based on 
single projectile penetrations.85 
The second data set comes from a study done by the University of Arizona. The 
scope of the project focuses on the compressive properties of Papercrete, a material made 
from various types of cellulose fibers (paper pulp), various types of pozzolans (cement), 
and water. In addition to the compressive properties, a limited number of preliminary 
                                                 
83 Hooke’s law, in simple terms, says that strain is directly proportional to stress. 
84 Materials Science & Engineering Dictionary, ed. Justin McCarthy, “Babylon Information Platform,” 
2011, http://www.engineering-dictionary.org/Materials-Science-and-Engineering-Dictionary/. 
85 Philip G. Malone and Joe G. Tom, “Foamed, Fiber-Reinforced Concrete as A Fragment Collecting 
Medium,” Engineering, Concrete and Materials Division, U.S. Army Waterways Experiment Station, Army 
Corps of Engineers, Vicksburg, 1998. 
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tests were performed. The objective of the tests was to gain some insight on other 
properties, such as creep, pull and fire resistance. The objectives were as follows. 
1. Determine a working Young’s modulus (E) of the different samples in 
order to choose the ideal mixture that has the higher stiffness and lower 
deformation. 
2. Study the deformation (creep) behavior of the selected samples under 
the application of constant load applied for a long period of time.  
3. Determine some thermal properties such as thermal conductivity (K), 
and thermal resistance (R). 
4. Determine the bond characteristics of the material by doing pull-out 
test.86 
3. Simulation 
Using mathematical simulation modeling, it is possible to examine the probable 
properties of various Papercrete mixes and compare them to the probable performance 
properties of SACON. 
4.  Shock Absorbing Concrete (SACON) 
SACON possesses ideal material properties desirable for the design parameters as 
shown in Figure 16. However, the process to make SACON is complex, expensive and 
requires specialized equipment. Therefore, SACON requirements are not conducive to 







                                                 
86 University of Arizona, The Center for Alternative Building Studies, “Papercrete Engineering 





Figure 16.   Results from Army Corps. of Engineer’s SACON test87 
 
Figure 17.   Millimeter to inches conversion 
                                                 
87 Malone and Tom, “Foamed, Fiber-Reinforced Concrete as A Fragment Collecting Medium,” 5. 
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Figure 18.   Properties of SACON88 
Data from Figure 18 is used to run the first simulation. By developing 1,000 
iterations of random numbers between the top 507.63 psi and the bottom 304.58 psi of 
the data set range and averaging them, then running the average 1,000 times again, test 
results can be simulated as if the actual test had been conducted 1,000,000 times. The 
simulation resulted in an average materials performance of 405 psi uniformed 
compressive strength, with a Bin between 399 psi and 411 psi. The low end representing 
the polypropylene reinforced SACON and the high end representing the steel reinforced 
SACON.  
 
                                                 







Figure 19.   Screen shot of Excel simulation  
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Figure 20.   Histogram of SACON simulation 
5. Papercrete 
The second data set comes from the University of Arizona Papercrete report. The 
same simulation process was run on the materials test results for the different mixes of 
Papercrete. Figure 21 shows that the variety of mixes and their subsequent test results are 
significant, in that they should closely represent the varied mixes and conditions that 
could be encountered where possible solutions will be constructed throughout the world.  
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Figure 21.   Properties of Papercrete89 
Data from Figure 21 is used to run the second simulation. By developing 1,000 
iterations of random numbers between the top 860 psi and the bottom 100 psi of the data 
set range and averaging them, then running the average 1,000 times again, test results can 
be simulated as if the actual test had been conducted 1,000,000 times. The simulation 
resulted in an average materials performance of 480 psi uniformed compressive strength, 
with a Bin between 459 psi and 500 psi. The low end represents mixes with less Portland 
                                                 
89 University of Arizona, The Center for Alternative Building Studies, “Papercrete Engineering 
Research Report, 2005, 3–5. 
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cement and cellulose fiber reinforcement and more alternative pozzolans. The high end 
represented mixes with higher Portland to aggregate and reinforcement ratios. 
Compared to the fibers that are prominent throughout the world, such as hemp, 
jute and coir, paper fibers have relatively low tensile strength. Using the results of the 
lowest preforming fibers to run the simulation allows for even greater confidence. 
 
 
Figure 22.   Screen shot of Papercrete simulation 
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Figure 23.   Histogram of Papercrete simulation 
6. Summary 
Based on the two simulations, the probability of SACON and Papercrete materials 
performance can be predicted. On average, SACON stress vs. strain elastic modulus is 
405 psi. According to the SACON test, SACON with an average elastic modulus of 405 
psi will have a high probably of stopping a round fired from a M16A2 rifle firing the 5.56 
mm NATO Ball M855 round at a depth between seven and eleven inches. The M16A2 
has a velocity of 990 to 1,000 m/s. The purpose of a 5.56 round is to penetrate deep into 
the target and fragment. Fortunately, fragmentation from an exploded fragmentation 
producing round, such as a 60 mm mortar round, is designed to rip and tear through its  
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target traveling at much slower speed. As a result, fragmentation has a lower target 
penetration. These characteristics of fragmentation are advantageous to the design 
concept. 
Papercrete’s average materials performance was 480 psi uniformed compressive 
strength, with a Bin between 459 psi and 500 psi. The simulation predicts that, on 
average, Papercrete’s material performance is comparable to that of SACON.  
The data from these simulations allows the thickness of the walls intended to stop 
fragmentation to be determined with relative predictability without doing preliminary 
field tests. Using the simulation data as a base line, preliminary construction design 
parameters will require seven to 10-inch walls to begin field experimentation. These 
simulations do not include the use of attenuating materials, such as perlite and 
vermiculite. The addition of these materials will increase the effectiveness of the 
structure walls. 
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VIII. MEETING THE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS  
A. EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR–COLLECTION POINT (ERW-CP) 
DESIGN 
 
Figure 24.   Explosive Remnants of War-Collection Point design concept 
1. Development 
The current design is an attempt to meet the established design requirements 
previously, developed after several years of first-hand experience and general analysis of 
the global ERW problem. After recognizing the ERW disposal and storage management 
capabilities gap existed at the lowest local levels, largely due to resource constraints, it 
was determined that local solutions were required.  
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The structure as designed will provide safe, secure, temporary storage of ERW at 
the lowest level. The structure is scalable, reproducible, and once constructed, will be 
clearly marked and easily accessible to the local ERW affected population. Testing will 
confirm that the structure will provide an acceptable level of protection from unintended 
ERW detonations. Finally, the building technique allows for easy construction by locals 
using primarily locally sourced building materials at little to no cost to the local 
population. The design has evolved considerably from a simple lockable box to the 
current cylindrical design. 
The universal approach to mitigating the effects of an explosion is a structure 
built of thick metal, and or a reinforced building material, in which the explosion is 
vented out the top of the structure. From the beginning of the design process, this concept 
has been maintained. It also provides an effective way to vent explosive forces up and 
away from the population while providing a way to secure ERW items within the 
structure.  
The unique design of the ERW-CP was developed with the understanding that 
explosive reactions will exploit any weakness in any material by taking the path of least 
resistance. Compounded with the reaction’s inability to make sharp turns, results in the 
reaction have nowhere else to go and “over-pressurize” containment and mitigation 
vessels.90 Most blast protection and mitigation structures overcome this limitation by 
using very thick of very strong ideal building materials. However, in keeping with the 
design requirements, using what is locally available and less than ideal, a different 
approach was required.   
The cylindrical structure and hemispherical shape of the internal base allows the 
chemical reaction of the explosion to take the path of least resistance, up and out, without 
having to turn around in any corners. These design features in combination with natural 
fiber reinforced building material properties allows for the use of less than ideal building 
materials. 
                                                 
90 Blasters Handbook, 341. 
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Although reinforced structural concrete is used prominently throughout the world, 
it is not a cost effective ERW mitigation option on the scale needed to address the ERW 
management gap. A look at developing-world building solutions already being 
implemented informed the proposed design. The use of locally sourced material and 
techniques eliminate, or significantly reduce, costs and logistical requirements. Through 
the research conducted, it was confirmed that naturally occurring cellulose fibers possess 
comparable reinforcing qualities to synthetic fibers at considerably less cost. It was also 
confirmed that natural structural reinforcement, such as bamboo, when applied properly, 
could perform as structural reinforcements, and waste, such as discarded tires, are a 
viable structural reinforcement that enhance design performance. 
B. BUILDING MATERIALS 
1. Sourcing 
Design requirements dictate that building materials be sourced at the local level. 
The current design is based on this concept. By using the predominate local fiber in 
conjunction with the locally available cement product or substitute, a suitable fiber 
reinforced building material can be produced. The spectrum of applicable building 
techniques range from fiber reinforced soil cements to fiber reinforced Portland-pozzalan 
based mixtures. As such, for the purpose of this section, fiber reinforced building 
materials will be referred to as FRBM.  
If individual elements of the FRBM cannot be purchased already prepared within 
cost limitations at the local level, the following adjustable standards can be referenced.  
2. Cements 
As referenced in Chapter VII, the location and circumstances at the local level 
will dictate which cement and technique will be used. If cement cannot be sourced 
locally, organizations providing assistance should be able to purchase materials at little 
cost. For the purposes of testing, variations of the soil cement technique and variations of 
the Portland-pazzalon cement technique were used.  
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3. Fibers 
Again, the location and circumstances at the local level will dictate which fiber 
and technique will be used. Regardless of fiber type, the optimal fiber length range is 
between 1/2”–2” separated from adjacent or connected fibers as much as possible, which 
can be accomplished in a number of ways and should ideally use the preferred local 
method. If no local method for processing fibers is available, several options are that can 
be locally fabricated and implemented, such as screen-less hammer-mills. The ERW-CP 
prototypes were constructed with both chopped fibers and raw fibers sourced from cedar 
bark. Chopped cedar bark closely represents Jute or Hemp fibers while raw cedar bark 
closely resembles Coir and sugarcane fibers. 
4. Reinforcements 
To meet design requirements, ideally, vertical and horizontal structural 
reinforcements will be locally sourced and limited only to the imagination of the builders 
and availability. For the purpose of building the prototypes and testing, limited metal, 
natural wood, bamboo, and discarded tires were used. This range of materials accurately 
represents the anticipated range of reinforcing materials available across the globe. 
However, through experience, discarded tires seem to be available even in the most 
isolated areas of the world. If available, tires should be used as the primary form of 
reinforcement. If tires are unavailable, any reinforcement materials can be used as most 
of the structural integrity is derived from the design, and provided by the FRBM itself.  
5. Structural Forms 
Although not required, very simple structural forms are highly recommended to 
construct the ERW-CPs. Forms greatly increase the speed of construction and overall 
appearance of the finished structure. The flexible material required for the forms should 
ideally be purchased or fabricated at the local level. As per the design requirements, the 
construction process needs to be repeated as necessary, which requires the forms 
themselves be reusable. The form concept, not the form material, is important. Once the 
construction concept is understood, any suitable flexible form making material can be 
used. The forms and the construction process will be described in detail, in Appendix A. 
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C. CONSTRUCTION TECHNIQUE 
The intent of the ERW-CP concept is to disseminate the design throughout as 
many ERW-affected populations as possible, which requires that all language and 
communication barriers be broken down. To resolve this situation, a How to Manual” and 
a pictographic “How To Poster” demonstrating several universally applicable 
construction concepts are presented in Appendix A.  
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IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. ERW AND INSTABILITY 
By identifying the specific characteristics that make ERW a continuous threat and 
hindrance to stabilization and development, a direct correlation can be made between 
instability and the mismanagement of ERW. This mismanagement allows it to remain a 
threat to life and limb. Mismanaged ERW is not only an immediate threat; it is being 
used as a primary component in IED fabrication throughout the world and poses a direct 
threat to deployed U.S. personnel and U.S. strategic partner personnel.  
The ERW management gap is caused by the relationship between the scale of 
ERW contamination and available ERW management capacity or limitations. Each 
country or region possesses specific variables that contribute to the ERW management 
gap. As a result of these country specific causes, efforts to mitigate that gap will, in turn, 
be affected by these same variables and need to be addressed on the same level. 
While ERW is a global problem, “first world” ERW management approaches are 
not always the solution. However robust the effort to remove ERW is, it cannot all be 
disposed of simultaneously, or even in a timely manner. Once discovered, if not disposed 
of onsite, ERW requires storage. Unfortunately, in developing and undeveloped regions, 
improvised management techniques and structures result that do not provide adequate 
protection to the populace, nor do they protect the ERW from further deterioration caused 
by the natural elements.  
Most of these situations are caused by a lack of access to knowledge and 
resources. At one end of the spectrum, simply digging a deep enough hole for ERW 
storage in every village affected by ERW is not an adequate storage solution. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, building military grade facilities is unrealistic. An 
appropriate, and sustainable, ERW management solution is required that is simple and 
scalable. 
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B. MEETING THE ERW-CP DESIGN PARAMETERS  
A structure is required that provides safe, secure, temporary storage of ERW at 
the village level. The structure must be scalable, readily available, and once constructed, 
clearly marked and easily accessible to the local ERW-affected population. The structure 
must provide an acceptable level of security to prevent the theft of the stored ERW. The 
system or structure must be easily constructed by affected populations using primarily, 
locally sourced building materials at little to no cost to the local population. 
By applying proven alternative building construction techniques, this study 
demonstrates that an effective state of the art design can be implemented using non-
traditional or natural structural reinforcement, in combination with natural fiber 
reinforced building materials by non-professional builders. Moreover, this study validates 
that the design is effective in mitigating the threat of mismanaged ERW by meeting the 
specified design requirements. 
The preliminary explosive tests conducted on 10 ERW-CPs built using the 
suggested practices verified all ERW-CP design parameters were met or exceeded. 
Appendix B contains a detailed analysis of the explosive tests conducted in a laboratory 
environment at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories (LLNL) High Explosive 
Application Facility (HEAF) and field-testing during the Joint Interagency Field 
Exploration (JFIX) event at Camp Roberts.  
The following is a brief synopsis of the results. 
1. Fragmentation 
All primary fragmentation was contained or defeated. Most secondary 
fragmentation having an impact energy of 58 ft-lb. or greater was mitigated to a distance 
of 24 ft., while all secondary fragmentation was eliminated at a distance of 50 ft. 
Additionally, the test dummy placed at 50 ft. from all ERW-CPs received no damage, and 
remained undisturbed throughout the entire test series. 
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2. Blast 
The K-24 blast overpressure mitigation level (>2.3 psi 15.9 kPa)91 was verified 
during the LLNL/HEAF tests by two PCB Piezotronic 137A21 pressure sensors at a 
distance approx. 40” to 35” from the outside diameter of the ERW-CP. A K- 50 (> 0.89 
psi) blast overpressure mitigation level was verified on five of the six shots, including a 2 
lb. NEW shot. Mitigation of the blast wave during the JIFX testing was verified by 
observation using high definition cameras and a test dummy.  
3. Thermal 
All thermal effects were mitigated through structural shielding provided by the 
ERW-CPs in both test series. As per DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards 
Manual (6055.9-STD), personnel protection must limit thermal fluxes to 0.3 calories per 
square centimeter per second [12.56 kilowatts per square meter]. Verification was 
accomplished via internal thermometers in the LLNL/HEAF spherical tank. During the 
JIFX field tests, thermal mitigation was verified by observing the actual redirection of 
explosive energy via high definition cameras. 
As with all designs, further testing and development is highly encouraged. 
However, due to the variety of construction materials the ERW-CP is designed to use, 
and the environments to which the ERW-CP is intended to be deployed, further 
development should not be geared toward any one standard. In keeping with the spirit of 
the project, the broadest spectrum of design dissemination and construction methodology 
should be maintained.   
C. ERW-CP DISSEMINATION RECOMMENDATIONS  
The ERW-CP design described and tested in this study implements a simple, 
scalable, design and construction methodology utilizing locally sourced, sustainable, and 
repurposed materials. Through a “train the trainer” approach, a basic “How to Manual,” 
in Appendix A, accompanied by a completely pictographic “How to Poster,” are 
                                                 
91 Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, 
“DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards 6055.9-STD,” 42. 
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presented as the preferred method of knowledge dissemination. Programs, such as 
Humanitarian Demining, Foreign Internal Defense and Village Stability Operations, 
along side international aid efforts are cited as examples of appropriate levels for 
disseminating the ERW-CP concept to assist in strategic partner capacity building, post 
conflict stabilization efforts, and the global ERW, Mine/UXO education, management, 
and disposal efforts. 
As further evidence of both the need for this type of ERW-CP design and the 
validity of the design dissemination effort, both humanitarian, the U.S. State Department, 
and DoD organizations, such as Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) 
Burners Without Borders, Central Command (CENTCOM) United States Department of 
Agriculture Fragile Market Economics Division, FAF Development Group LLC, Center 
for Armed Warfare and Armed Groups, and e-Afghan Ag, have all requested the manual 
and poster for immediate employment in their respective areas of operation. 
The ERW-CP concept fills the capability gap between digging a hole in the 
ground at the edge of an isolated village and large, professionally managed, “First 
World” ERW storage solutions  accomplished by empowering local ERW affected 
populations, with suitable state of the art design concepts that use simple, sustainable, 
construction methodologies. 
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APPENDIX A. “HOW TO MANUAL”  
A. PREREQUISITES 
1. Adhering to International Guidelines for Landmine and Unexploded 
Ordnance Awareness Education 
To implement an ERW-CP project properly, certain issues must be addressed. 
First, adherence to the UN’s “International Guidelines for Landmine and Unexploded 
Ordnance Awareness Education”92 programs must be maintained. Second, a simple, 
universally acceptable, procedure must be disseminated and implemented to get the ERW 
from the discovery site to secured areas in the ERW-CP. 
First, the UN Mine/UXO awareness mantra “Don’t touch it, mark it, report it,”93 
while idealistic, should be followed and must always be recommended, which may seem 
contradictory to the concept of a locally managed ERW collection point. However, an 
ERW-CP is only needed when no reliable reporting system is available above the local 
authority or, even when reported, the capacity to dispose of the ERW in a timely manner 
is not available. To adhere to the global Mine/UXO awareness programs, the ERW-CP 
project must hinge on following Mine/UXO awareness reporting procedures at the lowest 
levels of authority. However, it would be impossible not to provide a means for safely 
storing ERW brought in to local authorities even if one does not endorse the handling of 
ERW by untrained personnel.  
Second, in accordance with Mine/UXO awareness efforts, after the ERW is 
discovered and marked, the discovering individual must report the incident to the local 
leader or whoever is the local reporting authority. It then falls upon that local leader to 
determine an acceptable course of action. If a reporting system above the local level has 
been established but is unable to respond in what that local leader deems an effective 
timeframe, the leader has an option with an ERW-CP. Once it is determined by the local 
leader that action must be taken, this individual assumes the risk and a simple line pull 
                                                 




procedure,94 and wait time can be performed. After a successful line pull procedure, the 
ERW can then be transported to and secured within the ERW-CP. 
2. Dissemination and Overcoming Language Barriers 
The preferred dissemination technique is a train-the-trainer format though local 
engagement regardless of program or organization. To overcome all language barriers, 
this Appendix is to be used with the “How To Poster” comprised of the compiled figures 
used throughout this appendix.  
B. MATERIALS ACQUISITION AND PREPARATION 
1. Fiber Reinforced Building Material Preparation 
Proper preparation of FRBM is the most important element of the design. The 
FRBM gives the structure its strength and allows for the design requirements to be met. 
Local fibers prepared in the local custom are ideal. Figure 25 provides a list of common 
natural fibers found throughout the world. Figure 26 provides a comparison of raw fibers, 
which may be used if necessary, and chopped fibers of the proper length and texture. Six 








                                                 
94 A “line pull” is a procedure used to remotely move or “jar” UXO from a safe distance and under 
frontal and overhead protection. The procedure consists of evacuating the area of personnel and, without 
disturbing it, tying a line to the UXO. Once the line is around the UXO, the individual backs out to the 
predetermined safe distance and takes frontal and overhead protection. The individual then forcefully pulls 
the UXO several feet from its original resting place and waits 30 minutes to an hour. If the UXO does not 
detonate, it is deemed safe to move.  
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Coir (fiber from the 
coconut shell) 
Palm Fiber Bamboo fiber Umbrella plant Milkweed 
Piña Abacá Cotton Kapok 
Bast fibers  Nettles Esparto Bowstring Hemp  
Jute Kenaf Henequen Hemp 
Flax Hoopvine Elephant Grass Yucca (An agave) 
Water Reed Plantain Musamba Wood Fiber (kraft 
pulp) 
Maguey Lechuguilla Banana Leaf Guaney 
Figure 25.   Natural Fibers 
   
Figure 26.   Chopped fibers 1/2”–2” (1.5–5 cm) compared to raw fibers 
a. Cements/Soil  
Any Portland cement will suffice, as will any alternative pozzalan, such as 
RHA or Fly Ash. Two to three 90 lbs. bags of cement should suffice. However, if 
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available, the more cement used the stronger the ERW-CP will be. Likewise, any earth 
will suffice. However, some soil properties are preferred. such as clay and sand content. 
The local population should know the soil content and suitability. Ideally, top-soil is not 
desirable for use due to the abundance of organic material. If necessary, dig into the side 
of a hill or down a few feet to reach the proper soil. However, a dampened soil sample 
can be balled upm and it holds together well without crumbling or cracking, it is suitable. 
If it is possible to roll out the soil and form it into a horseshoe shape without breaking, it 
has high clay content and is considered ideal.  
To ensure the proper soil consistency is reached, separate the larger 
aggregate (rocks) from the soil with a simple, large soil sieve or the preferred local 
method. A four ft. (one 1/2 meter) diameter pile approximately three ft. (one meter) high 
should supply enough soil for one ERW-CP. 
b. Mix Quantities and Ratios 
The ERW-CPs are constructed using equal parts by volume of fiber and 
cementious matrix mix. Although fiber ratios for making traditional building products, 
such as straw reinforced adobe are much less, usually around 5–10%, regular building 
materials are not intended to mitigate explosions. 
Whether mixing the fiber into a Portland cement matrix or a soil cement 
matrix, it is essential that the fiber and the cementious matrix be dry mixed thoroughly to 
allow the fibers and the cementious matrix be evenly distributed without clumping 
together. The result should be completely “cement dust” covered fibers. Water is added 
later in limited quantities until the proper “mud” consistency is reached. The mixing is 
done by whatever means is common to normal cement/concrete building techniques. 
However, if no local techniques exist, the mixing can be done in batches on a mixing tarp 
or directly on the ground with simple hand tools, which is covered again in detail. 
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2. Reinforcement Prep 
a. Tires 
If unserviceable truck tires are available, they should be used as the 
optimal ERW-CP reinforcement. Tire reinforced ERW-CP structures are unique, in that 
the tires serve as both the horizontal and the vertical structural reinforcement, and 
drastically reduce construction materials and time.  
Large truck tires are preferred as they provide a larger Inside Diameter 
(I.D.), or rim size. However, if no truck tires or large rimed tires are available to 
accommodate a 20–24 inch (50–60 cm) I.D., smaller tires can be used. Figure 27 
demonstrates removing the sidewalls of smaller tires and cutting the tires vertically in one 
spot. The tire treads can be made into strips and then woven through vertical 
reinforcements to form a very strong “tire basket” that will serve as the reinforcement. 
The basket method is described in detail later.  
 
 
Figure 27.   Tire prep 
b. Vertical Reinforcements 
If no tires are available, other structural reinforcements can be used. All 
other vertical reinforcements regardless of material should be as strait as possible and a 
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minimum of approximately 3 ft. (approx. one meter). If available, bamboo is highly 
recommended. Whatever material the local population is able to produce will be suitable.  
Vertical reinforcements can vary in diameter; however, reinforcements 
should be approximately 1/2” (1.27 cm) and no smaller than 1/4” (.635cm) in diameter. 
The vertical reinforcements will act as the framework for the horizontal reinforcements. 
A minimum of eight vertical reinforcements is recommended for each ERW-CP. 
However, the number of reinforcements is subject to availability and weaving material. 
The thicker or stiffer the horizontal weaving material, such as tire strips, the less vertical 
reinforcements can be used. The thinner or more flexible the horizontal weaving material, 
such as bamboo strips, the more vertical reinforcements can be used. 
c. Horizontal Reinforcements 
Horizontal reinforcements regardless of material should be secured or 
interwoven onto or into the vertical reinforcements as best as possible. As stated, 
horizontal reinforcements can consist of any material with substantial tensile strength 
including wastes products, such as plastic bags and bottles cut into strips. Tire or bamboo 
strips are highly recommended, but any material used to weave local baskets will suffice.  
3. Inside Diameter (I.D.) Form Preparation 
To withstand the weight and pressure of the FRBM against the I.D. form, it needs 
to be ridged. A ridged core wrapped in a thick plastic sheet is recommended. This 
configuration allows the FRBM to set around the I.D. form while allowing the form to be 
removed easily and reused. However, in keeping with design requirements, any system 
that can be devised following this concept can be used, as long as the I.D. surface is 
relatively smooth and is no smaller than 20” (50.8 cm). 
4. Ground Prep 
Very little ground prep is required. The most import aspect of ground prep is site 
location. The ERW-CP site must be within the complete control of the local population, 
preferably within view of the established local authorities, out of high traffic areas to 
allow access to the ERW-CP, yet provide a layer of security. If possible, maximize the 
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distance of the ERW-CP from inhabited areas while maintaining purview over the site. A 
50 ft. (15.24) circle of uninhabited space should surround the ERW-CP. If the level of 
ERW contamination is suspected or is known to be high, a site should be chosen that 
would allow for several ERW-CPs to be constructed within close proximity. A 50 ft. 
(15.24m) is not required between ERW-CPs, as little risk of sympathetic detonation 
exists should an ERW item unintentionally detonate within an adjacent ERW-CP. 
However, sufficient space to allow easy of movement between ERW-CPs is 
recommended.  
The site should be as level as possible, on stable soil and clear of debris. A level 
six ft. (2 m) area is more than sufficient for the ERW-CP structure. However, additional 
workspace is recommended. 
 
 
Figure 28.   Ground preparation 
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C. BUILDING THE ERW-CP 
Once all FRBM, horizontal and vertical reinforcement, form and ground 
perpetrations have been made, construction can begin. Two versions of the ERW-CP with 
distinct construction techniques exist. the “tire” ERW-CP, and the “basket” ERW-CP. 
 
*IMPORTANT* 
*FOLLOW THIS DRY MIXING PROCEDURE* 
It is important to follow this dry mixing procedure to ensure the binding agents 
properly and completely coat or encapsulate the fibers. The material ratios are very 
simple and can be scaled appropriately. At a minimum, 1/2 bucket of cement added to 
one bucket of fiber and dry mix together. Then add one bucket of soil to the cement and 
fiber mix and dry mix together. Followed by adding 1/2 bucket of sand to the cement, 
soil, and fiber mix, and dry mixed again. Figure 29 provides an example. It is understood 
that a five-gallon bucket will not always be available. Based on this assumption, it is 
important to remember that the ratios are the most important factor as opposed to the 
actual volume amounts. 
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Figure 29.   Sample FRBM dry mixing ratios pictograph based on five-gallon bucket 
and mixing tarp 
After the dry mixing procedure has been followed, and the fibers are completely 
coated or “dusted” in the binding matrix, water can be added in small amounts until the 
desired mud consistency is reached. 
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1. Tire Reinforced ERW-CP 
If using whole tires, the tires will be stacked three to four high, (approximately 1 
ft. feet or 1 m high) and filled with FRBM. The recommended method is to place the 
initial tire in the middle of the prepared site. Form a base layer or FRBM inside the tire 
directly on the ground. Continue packing the tire with FRDM while forming the 
hemispherical bottom as shown in Figure 30. 
 
 
Figure 30.   Hemispherical bottom formation  
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Continue stacking and packing the tires with FRBM one at a time until the 
minimum height of approximately 3 ft. (1 m) is reached as per the process described in 
Figure 30 and shown in Figure 31. Once complete, the tires will then be encased in a thin 
layer of FRBM in a manner similar to plastering or applying stucco to a wall.  
 
 
Figure 31.   Stacked tires without exterior finish 
2. Basket Reinforced ERW-CP 
When not using whole tires, vertical stabilizers are used to provide the structural 
support. The vertical stabilizers can be driven directly into the ground eight to 12” (25.4 
cm) away from a suitable 20”–24” (50–60 cm) I.D. form. If driven into the ground, an 
above ground height of approximately 3’ ft. (1 m) high must be maintained.  
Alternatively, a base layer of FRBM can be used to “set” the vertical stabilizers in 
position. A base layer of FRBM several inches deep, 8”–10” (25.4 cm) wide, should be 
placed around a suitable 20”–24” (50.8 cm) I.D. form. Once the base layer has firmed up 
slightly, the vertical stabilizers are placed vertically into the FRBM at the outer most 
edge.  
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Once the vertical stabilizers are “set,” the horizontal stabilizer material is woven 
into the vertical stabilizers to form a basket as shown in Figure 32.  
 
 
Figure 32.   Base prep and vertical reinforcement placement 
FRBM is then placed between the I.D. form and the basket to build up the 
cylindrical wall of the ERW-CP as shown in Figure 33.  
 
Figure 33.   Filling a tire basket with FRBM 
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Once the FRBM wall has been placed, set two security eyelets 180 degrees apart 
within the top two inches (6 cm) of the ERW-CP rim, as shown in Figure 34. A matching 
set of security eyelets will be set into the ERW-CP lid to allow the ERW-CP to be 
secured. 
 
Figure 34.   Setting security eyelets 
After a few hours, the I.D. form can be removed and work can begin on the 
internal hemispheric bottom of the ERW-CP. Once the I.D. form is removed, the internal 
hemispherical base must be formed. The internal hemispherical base provides the proper 
shape and mass for the base of the structure to redirect the thermal effects and blast wave 
of a detonation.  
A base layer of FRBM is placed directly on the ground inside the ERW-CP wall 
approximately 3” thick. The FRBM is then formed and finished smooth by hand to form 
the I.D. hemisphere in the same manner as the tire reinforced ERW-CP, as shown in 
Figure 35. Completing this process immediately after the I.D. form is removed allows the 
core and the hemispherical base to set and cure together creating a bonded unit.  
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Figure 35.   Finished internal hemispherical base  
3. ERW-CP Lid  
The lid of the ERW-CP is constructed of roughly 3” of the same FRBM as the 
base. The 20”–24” (50.8 cm) I.D. hole in the middle of the lid will match the I.D. of the 
base to allow the detonation to vent directly up and out of the ERW-CP away from the 
surrounding area, as shown in Figure 36. Any available reinforcements capable of 




Figure 36.   ERW-CP lid construction with flexible form 
4. External Finish 
Once the core of the ERW-CP has set, an external finish must be applied. The 
external finish serves several purposes. First, it gives the ERW-CP a permanent, secure, 
impenetrable look. Second, although thin, it provides yet another layer of FRBM to 
mitigate the effects of a detonation. Third, it provides a smooth maintainable surface to 
paint, which protects the ERW and the structural integrity of the ERW-CP from the 
elements. Lastly, it provides a finished surface to paint on or adhere to for international 
symbols or labels regarding explosive hazards or mines. 
The finish layer of FRBM should be of the proper consistency to stick to the walls 
of the exterior of the ERW-CP core. It may be difficult to adhere the exterior finish layer 
to tire ERW-CPs. If available, burlap fabric, coffee/rice sacks, or a similar mesh may be 




Figure 37.   External FRBM Finish applied to mesh 
Likewise, once the ERW-CP lid is set and cured, it is turned over and a thin 
external finish is applied covering the venting hole, which is easily accomplished by 
placing any very thin material or fabric over the lid vent hole and applying exterior 
finishing material over the whole lid that is done for the same reasons the external finish 
is applied to the base. See Figure 38. 
 
 
Figure 38.   External FRBM Finish applied to mesh on lid 
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It is recommended that ERW-CPs be constructed well in advance of the discovery 
of ERW. As with most cement-based products, the longer the structure is allowed to cure, 
the stronger it becomes. However, if required, the ERW-CP may be used after a 24-hour 
curing period. In the case of immediate usage, it is recommended that ERW-CPs not be 
used or painted until signs of moisture are no longer visible. This time frame will depend 
on weather conditions and the amount of water used in the FRBM mix. Figure 39 
displays an example of ERW placement in ERW-CP. 
 
 
Figure 39.   Example of ERW placement in ERW-CP 
D. SYSTEM RETIREMENT AND MATERIAL RECYCLING/DISPOSAL 
If the construction process was followed properly and proper maintenance 
preformed, such as regular painting, the ERW-CP should have a considerable life span. 
As signs of weathering and degradation appear, the structure should be replaced.  
However, it is anticipated that in the spirit of safety, and recognizing the benefits 
of the ERW-CP explosive mitigation, qualified disposal personnel may chose to use the 




encouraged, as long as the customary explosive disposal safety measures are followed. 
Once a disposal operation has been conducted within an ERW-CP, the structure must be 
replaced.  
All material used in the construction of the ERW-CP should be locally sourced. 
Therefore, all material should be easily disposed of or repurposed. Natural fibers and 
cements can simply be left to decompose naturally or repurposed. In the case of tire 
reinforced ERW-CPs, if the structural integrity of the tire and FRBM is sound, it may be 
reused by simply restacking and refinishing the interior and exterior. However, the lid 
will need to be completely replaced. The same applies in the case of tire basket reinforced 
ERW-CPs. If the tire tread strips are still in good condition, they can be reused in the 
newly constructed ERW-CP.  
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APPENDIX B. DETAILS OF ERW-CP TEST AND EVALUATION 
A. TESTING FACILITIES  
1. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories’ High Explosives 
Application Facility  
To test the ERW-CP design, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories High 
Explosive Application Facility (HEAF) graciously volunteered the use of their facility. 
The ERW-CP test platforms and structures were constructed off site and transported to 
HEAF’s large spherical tank, Figure 40. 
The High Explosives Application Facility (HEAF) has seven fully 
contained firing tanks for testing explosive quantities from less than a 
gram up to 10 kilograms (22 pounds) net explosive weight. These tanks 
provide a way to conduct explosive experiments indoors under well-
controlled conditions with elaborate dynamic diagnostics. HEAF is 
equipped with extensive, high-fidelity, high-speed diagnostic capabilities 
including x-ray radiography, x-ray tomography, high-speed photography,  
Many types of tests are executed in these tanks including cylinder test for 
detonation performance, blast tests for enhanced blast explosives 
including thermites and thermobarics, and the scaled thermal explosion 
(STEX) test to characterize the violence of thermal explosions due to 
physical containment coupled with elevated temperatures. HEAF was 
recently tasked by TSA and Homeland Security to investigate the threat of 
“improvised explosives”, those that could be formulated by a terrorist 
using commercially available materials.95 
                                                 
95 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, “LLNL’s High Explosives Applications Facility,” July 
10, 2009, https://wci.llnl.gov/fac/heaf/activities_ops/tanks_gun.html.  
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Figure 40.   HEAF spherical tank 
2. JIFX—Camp Roberts Range 18  
A second series of tests were conducted under field conditions on Camp Roberts 
during the Naval Postgraduate School’s Joint Field Interagency Exploration (JFIX) event. 
The explosive tests were supported by Camp Roberts Range Control and U.S. Army 
217th EOD. 
B. PREPARATION FOR TEST AND EVALUATION 
1. Testing Platforms and Structures 
The design requirements mandate that the structure be functional on a variety of 
surfaces, the most likely of which will be bare earth. However, the LLNL HEAF testing 
facilities do not allow for bare earth contact. To simulate bare earth, portable-testing 
platforms were constructed and filled with no less than 8” of compacted dirt. The ERW-
CPs were then constructed on the test platforms, using the methods described in 
Appendix A, and transported to the testing facility. The test platforms were then placed 
on reinforced solid steel platforms to undergo the explosive tests. See Figure 41. 
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Figure 41.   Testing Platform Set Up 
For the JIFX field-testing the ERW-CP structures were constructed on Camp 
Roberts and transported to the Range 18 via flatbed truck. Range 18 allowed for the 
ERW-CPs to be placed directly on the ground for a realist scenario. Unfortunately, in 
both instances, the structural integrity of both test sets were somewhat compromised in 
transit, which resulted in hairline fractures and open cracks in all structures. However, 
due to the layered nature of the structural design, these cracks were deemed to have 
minimal effect on the tests. Since field versions are to be constructed in place, and used in 
place, the JIFX Camp Roberts testing became more conservative. 
2. ERW Simulation Device 
a. LLNL / HEAF 
The characteristics of actual ERW vary greatly, which makes them an 
unreliable unit of measure to conduct tests.  To simulate ERW in a controlled manner, 
many of the tests conducted on commercially available containment and mitigation 
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solutions use a base line of 1 lb. TNT equivalent, of black powder. Likewise, the ERW-
CP test parameters will use a base line of 1 lb. TNT equivalent, of composition 4 (C-4) 
explosive. Of the tests conducted, the NEW averaged 456.5 g or 1 lb. 0 oz. with the 
addition of the PBX boosters. 
Although the TNT equivalents are the same compared to the COTS 
mitigation devices, C-4 has a higher brisance than black powder.  Brisance is the 
shattering or crushing effect of a high explosive as a result of the speed at which the 
explosive reaction occurs. In laymen’s terms, this phenomenon makes C-4 a more 
powerful explosive than black powder, which makes the ERW-CP tests more robust than 
the industry standard. 
Much like the sandbag mitigation technique, the test parameters were 
designed assuming that any ERW with a diameter greater than 6” contains more than 1 
lb. net explosive weight (NEW) and will exceed the mitigation capabilities of the ERW-
CP. To simulate an ERW fragmentation pattern, the 1 lb. explosive charge is placed in a 
scored, caped, galvanized metal sleeve (caped pipe nipple). See Figure 42. These limits 
and test parameters are conducive to similar or greater than tests conducted on 
commercially available containment and mitigation devices. Simulating a fragmentation 
producing ordnance item containing 1 lb. of explosive falls within the parameters of EOD 




      
Figure 42.   ERW simulator (pipe-bomb) and two lb. shot  
b. JIFX  
Based on the ERW-CPs’ performance during the LLNL/HEAF tests. the 
test parameters were expanded. The NEW of the ERW simulation devices used in the 
field tests was increased from 1 lb. TNT equivalent to 1 lb. 4 oz. C-4 or 566.99 g, which 
is the standard M-112 demolition charge used by the DoD. This increase may not seem 
significant; however, due to the nature of high explosives, any increase in NEW should 
be considered significant. Additionally, this configuration very closely resembles the 
EOD shot set-up of a single item ERW disposal operation.   
C. TEST PERFORMANCE, DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
The controlled environment and instruments used to conduct the LLNL/HEAF 
explosive tests were well beyond the requirements needed to provide an ERW-CP proof 
of concept. Due to the unpredictable nature of variations in ERW-CP quality, a broad 
scope of ERW-CP building materials were used in construction. As a result, broad scopes 
of performance parameters were expected. LLNL/HEAF personnel conducted all 
explosives preparation and firing, test equipment setup, and data collection. LLNL/HEAF 
personnel and the design team conducted analysis of the data. 
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1. LLNL/HEAF Test Parameters and Setup 
a. Frag 
Goal: Completely contain or defeat of all primary fragmentation.  
Verification: Any fragmentation penetration could be observed via 
Phantom high-speed cameras. Verification was accomplished by the lack of visible signs 
of fragmentation penetration on the interior wall of the spherical tank, and the lack of 
fragmentation outside of the ERW-CP structural remains.  
b. Blast 
Goal: The desired K-24 blast mitigation level is the best-case scenario. 
Blast wave mitigation levels of K-50 are considered a successful test. As per DoD 
Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards Manual (6055.9-STD), personnel 
protection must limit incident blast overpressure to 2.3 psi (15.9 kPa).96 
Verification: Blast wave mitigation was observed via PCB Piezotronic 
137A21 pressure sensors at a distance approximately 36” from the outside diameter of 
the ERW-CP. The two sensors were placed at mid-structure and base/lid seam level.  
c. Thermal 
Goal: Thermal effects are far less of a concern than fragmentation and 
blast. It is believed that the combination of distance and structural shielding provided by 
the ERW-CP will sufficiently mitigate all thermal effects. As per DoD Ammunition and 
Explosives Safety Standards Manual (6055.9-STD), personnel protection must limit 
thermal fluxes to 0.3 calories per square centimeter per second [12.56 kilowatts per 
square meter]. 
Verification: Thermal mitigation was observed via internal spherical tank 
thermometers and Phantom high-speed cameras. 
                                                 
96 Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, 
“DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards 6055.9-STD,” 42. 
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2. LLNL HEAF Testing Results 
The initial testing conducted on various ERW-CP designs was deemed a success. 
All observable test and design parameters were met. No primary fragmentation 
penetrated the exterior of the ERW-CPs. Due to the size of the spherical test chamber 16 
(16 ft. 4.8 m) mitigation of secondary fragmentation mitigation was not confirmed. 
However, based on the projected trajectory of ERW-CP exterior fragments viewed in the 
high-speed video, it was determined that the majority of fragments would have impacted 
the ground within 24 ft.  
Blast wave mitigation was confirmed by observing peak pressure waves well 
below 2.3 psi taken at two positions averaging 36” from the ERW-CP at the base and lid 
levels, which is very encouraging as the 2.3 psi limitation is for a minimum distance of 
approx. 30 ft. from detonation point. The outlier in the test set, shot four (S-C-W-NF), 
was a result of a non-fragmentation producing explosive charge. In the absence of the 
pipe, the explosive reaction was allowed to expand uninhibited. The noticeable psi 
increase in shot six (S-C-B-F) was the result of doubling the explosive weight to 
approximately 2 lbs.  
However, as observed, the increase in the measured blast wave in both instances 
was less 1.1 psi or less than half of the 2.3 psi blast wave threshold. With the exception of 
shot four, the remainder of the shots measured below 0.5 psi, which is well below K-50 at 
0.89 psi.  
Four of the shots averaged 0.34 psi, which is within the range of K-70 to K-111. 
In the K-70 to K-111 range, individuals will experience fullness in the ear or 
ringing/roaring (tinnitus) and some may experience mild vertigo.97 To reiterate, these 
measurements were taken at two points, 36” from the surface of the ERW-CP and 
represent peak psi at the sensors. See Figure 43. 
                                                 




Figure 43.   ERW-CP Explosive Testing Blast Wave Mitigation 
Thermal effect mitigation was confirmed by observing the energy deflection via 
the Phantom high-speed cameras and a temperature increase of less than three degrees on 
average inside the spherical test chamber. The outlier in the test set (S-C-W-NF) was a 
result of a non-fragmentation producing explosive charge. In the absence of the pipe, the 
explosive reaction was allowed to expand uninhibited. The slight variation in shot (S-C-
B-F) was due to a doubling of explosive weight to approximately 2 lbs. However, as 
observed, the increase in temperature for shot (S-C-B-F) was less than three degrees and 
can be considered negligible. See Figure 44.  
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Figure 44.   ERW-CP Explosive Testing Blast Wave Mitigation 
3. JIFX Field Test Parameters and Setup 
The desired test results of the JIFX field tests are the same as the LLNL/HEAF 
tests. However, due to field conditions, the only method of verification was observation.  
a. Frag 
Goal: Completely contain or defeat of all primary fragmentation. Mitigate 
the effects of secondary fragmentation having an impact energy of 58 ft-lb. or greater to a 
distance of 24 ft. and eliminate secondary fragmentation to a distance of 50 ft.  
Verification: Any primary fragmentation penetration could be observed 
via high-definition cameras, as well as observation of secondary fragmentation. A 24 ft. 
radius circle was placed on the ground around each ERW-CP. Additionally, a test dummy 




Goal: The desired K-24 blast mitigation level is the best-case scenario. 
Blast wave mitigation levels of K-50 are considered a successful test. As per DoD 
Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards Manual (6055.9-STD), personnel 
protection must limit incident blast overpressure to 2.3 psi (15.9 kPa).98 
Verification: Blast overpressure/wave mitigation was observed via PCB 
Piezotronic 137A21 pressure sensors at a distance approximately 40” to 35” from the 
outside diameter of the ERW-CP. The two sensors were placed at mid-structure and 
base/lid seam level.  
c. Thermal 
Goal: Thermal effects are far less of a concern than fragmentation and 
blast. It is believed that the combination of distance and structural shielding provided by 
the ERW-CP will sufficiently mitigate all thermal effects. As per DoD Ammunition and 
Explosives Safety Standards Manual (6055.9-STD), personnel protection must limit 
thermal fluxes to 0.3 calories per square centimeter per second [12.56 kilowatts per 
square meter]. 
Verification: Thermal mitigation was observed via internal spherical tank 
thermometers and Phantom high-speed cameras. 
4. JIFX Field Testing Results 
The ERW-CP field-testing went extremely well. After reviewing the 
LLNL/HEAF explosive testing data, the team was confident that any fragments resulting 
from the fracturing of the ERW-CP exterior did not have the required force to be 
considered secondary fragmentation. However, it was not until the field test that it could 
be confirmed. As expected, even with the increase in simulated ERW explosive weight, 
no primary fragmentation escaped the ERW-CP. As with the LLNL/HEAF tests, the 
exterior of the ERW-CP exterior fragmented from the main structure. However, the 
                                                 
98 Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, 
“DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards 6055.9-STD, 42. 
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majority of the fractured ERW-CP exterior came to rest well within 24 ft. of ground zero. 
A few ERW fragments landed within or just outside of the 24 ft. radius but came to rest 
within a few feet after landing. No ERW-CP exterior fragments reached the 50 ft. radius 
limit.   
Blast wave mitigation was observed via high-definition cameras placed next to 
the test dummy 50 ft. from the outside diameter of the ERW-CP. Although no pressure 
sensors were available, blast wave mitigation was visible via high definition video. As 
both LLNL/HEAF and the JIFX ERW-CP structures preformed similarly, it can be 
assumed that the same blast wave mitigation level of > 2.3 psi was maintained.  
Thermal mitigation was observed in the same manner as described above. Via 
high-definition cameras, all thermal effects were completely redirected up. See photo 













Figure 45.   Successful bamboo reinforced ERW-CP field test photo series 
5. Summary 
The ERW-CP design concept is ready to field. The preliminary tests conducted 
verified all ERW-CP design parameters were met or exceeded.  
a. Frag 
All primary fragmentation was contained or defeated. Most secondary 
fragmentation having an impact energy of 58 ft-lb. or greater was mitigated to a distance 
of 24 ft. while all secondary fragmentation was eliminated at a distance of 50 ft. 
Additionally, the test dummy placed at 50 ft. from all ERW-CPs received no damage, and 
remained undisturbed throughout the entire test series. 
b. Blast 
The K-24 blast overpressure mitigation level (>2.3 psi 15.9 kPa)99 was 
verified during the LLNL/HEAF tests by two PCB Piezotronic 137A21 pressure sensors 
                                                 
99 Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, 
“DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards 6055.9-STD, 42. 
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at a distance approximately 40” to 35” from the outside diameter of the ERW-CP. A K- 
50 (> 0.89 psi) blast overpressure mitigation level was verified on five of the six shots, 
including the 2 lbs. shot. Mitigation of the blast wave during the JIFX testing was 
verified by observation using high definition cameras and a test dummy.  
c. Thermal 
All thermal effects were mitigated through structural shielding provided 
by the ERW-CPs in both test series. As per DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety 
Standards Manual (6055.9-STD), personnel protection must limit thermal fluxes to 0.3 
calories per square centimeter per second [12.56 kilowatts per square meter]. Verification 
was accomplished via internal thermometers in the LLNL/HEAF spherical tank. During 
the JIFX field tests, thermal mitigation was verified by observing the actual redirection of 
explosive energy via high definition cameras. 
d. Conclusion 
As with all designs, further testing and development is highly encouraged. 
However, due to the variety of construction materials the ERW-CP is designed to use. 
and the environments to which the ERW-CP is intended to be deployed, further 
development should not be geared toward any one standard. In keeping with the spirit of 
the project, the broadest spectrum of design dissemination and construction methodology 
should be maintained.   
The ERW-CP design described and tested in this study implements a 
simple, scalable, design and construction methodology utilizing locally sourced, 
sustainable, and repurposed materials. Through a train the trainer approach, a basic “How 
to Manual,” Appendix A, accompanied by a completely pictographic “How to Poster,” 
are presented as the preferred method of knowledge dissemination. Programs, such as 
Humanitarian Demining, Foreign Internal Defense and Village Stability Operations, 
along side International Aid efforts, are cited as examples of appropriate levels of 
disseminating the ERW-CP concept to assist in strategic partner capacity building, post 
conflict stabilization efforts, and the global ERW, Mine/UXO education, management, 
and disposal efforts. 
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